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INTRODUCTION OF THE PROBLEM AND 
JUSTIFICATION FOR RESEARCH 
Water is among the most abundant of all materials known to 
man. In all its various forms, water covers 75 percent of the earth's 
surface . It is estimated that the total physical quantity of water on the 
earth is 326, 000, 000 cubic miles (14). This apparent abundance belies 
the true nature of the water resource as it relates to the needs of man. 
At any given point in time, only a rather minute portion of this vast 
quantity of water is found in those forms and locations which render it 
useful to man. This may be attributed to the fact that uti.li.ty in water is 
perishable and the efforts of man to amend the hydrological cycle have 
been successful only to a limited extent (1). 
Presently, expanded economic activity coupled with population 
increases threaten to exhaust the economic supply in some areas. This 
is especially true in some major urban centers and in the arid western 
United States . If current projections concerning population and water 
use patterns materialize in the future, human ingenuity will do well to 
keep pace with burgeoning demand. 
Water is not a single use resource. Uses range from the aesthetic 
such as the fountain which enhances the beauty of a park, to the common, 
such as irrigation and the dilution of sewage. Quantity, quality, and 
location of water is often such that it may be used by any one of a 
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multiplicity of uses or users. When water is scarce, this gives rise to 
competition within and among uses such as agriculture, manufacturing, 
and domestic consumption. This is not to say that all uses are com-
petitive. Water stored in a reservoir for irrigation may also be used 
for recreation or to generate hydro-electric power without reducing 
the quantity available for irrigation. The relationship here is supple-
mentary and perhaps even complementary . However, an allocation 
problem does exist any time supply is insufficient to satiate demand 
and uses are competitive (10, p. 34-36). 
Future resource availability for any use or user is dependent upon 
one or both of two areas of activity (10, p. 32) . The first involves 
augmentation of the usable physical supply by effecting greater control 
of the hydrological cycle. Examples of this include such activities as 
converting sea water, seeding clouds, tapping glacier ice; and more 
commonly, watershed management, reservoir construction, canal 
lining, use of underground storage, and adaptation of more efficient 
application methods. 
The second area of activity involves the allocative machinery 
which determines the disposition of both existing and potential supplies. 
In Utah and throughout the United States, these are composed of a 
heterogeneous accumulation of institutions, given credence by formal 
law and community mores . The term institution is used here in the 
broader sense of an established practice, law or custom, which is 
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usually, but not always, represented by some formal organization. 
These institutions vary greatly in organization and function, but in 
certain respects their influence on the allocation of water among 
competing uses and users appears to be a critical factor in determining 
what benefit society may obtain from a limited quantity of water. 
Any statement concerning the relative merits of the development 
of new supplies versus refinement or abandonment of some of the present 
allocative machinery as a means of meeting the increasing demand for 
water is subject to conjecture. Both alternatives merit consideration, 
and they are interrelated. In this study, water institutions received 
primary focus. 
A multiplicity of methods could be used to effect a different 
allocation of water among competing uses . They could be expected to 
run the entire gamut from seizure and distribution by an unquestioned 
authority to laissez-faire. The one extreme seems to imply that a 
supposed omnipotent person, bureau, agency, etc., has unassailable 
l<.nowledge and author ity whi.ch allows it to effect the best allocation 
for society. The other extreme suggests that society is best served 
when each individual with an interest in water is allowed to make and 
effect his own decisions. It should be obvious that neither extreme can 
be entirely applicable . 
Much of the current literature tends to support schemes approaching 
the more authoritative methods of allocation. These are modified in some 
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instances by reservations with respect to compensation for loss of rights 
and a limitation to specific uses. A limited amount of support can be 
found for a more laissez-faire approach to water allocation . These are 
tempered by a recognition of the need for institutions which insure 
property rights and provide for flexibility in control of the resource. 
With few exceptions there is a surprising lack of empirical evidence to 
support a general movement toward either approach. 
Decisions made by legislators, administrators, policy-makers, 
etc., at various times in the past have suffered from lack of sufficient 
evidence pertaining to the alternatives at hand. This study was an 
attempt to provide some enlightenment in the area of water allocation 
by evaluating the efficiency implications associated with a removal of 
selected transfer restrictions affecting irrigation water. 
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
In utah, water allocation is subject to administrative mani-
pulation under the appropriative doctrine of water law. Because it is 
an economic necessity, flexibility in the control of water is probably 
as great as it is in any other state. Many decisions of the administrative 
agencies have allowed increased flexibility and more efficient utilization 
of existing supplies (25). Evidences of narket allocation can be found 
throughout the state. Even so, certain influences are present in the 
institutions pertinent to water which restrict free transfer and might 
possibly effect a misallocation of the resource. 
No attempt was made in this study to identify and explore the 
ramifications of all possible impediments to transfer which may result 
from the influence of institutional factors. Rather, this study was an 
attempt to determine if market allocations of water under conditions of 
comparatively free transfer conditions were more efficient, in the 
economic sense, than allocation by administrative rules and legal rights. 
Objectives 
Specific objectives of the study were as follows : 
1. To describe the water market, 
2. To determine the market values placed on the rights to water 
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within a given use, 
3. To identify selected changes in the institutional fac tors 
pertinent to water which restrict free transfer of water, and to determine 
how critical they are in misallocation. 
The first two objectives were prelimina ry steps toward the 
accomplishment of the third and primary objective of the study. 
The first objective, to describe the water market, was accomplished 
by summarizing the data supplied by persons familiar with market practices 
found in the study area, giving special emphasis to the development, 
operation, and flexibility of the water rental market. 
The second objective, to determine the values placed on the rights 
to water within a given use, was accomplished by capitalizing the average 
annua l rental price at an "appropriate" rate of interest. In an effort 
to simulate uncertainties found in the real world, an expectation model 
was incorporated into these calculations. 
In order to accomplish the third objective, it was necessary to 
identify policy changes affecting the study area which a priori. would 
have influenced flexi.bi.li.ty. In addition, it was necessary to find a 
measure of value which would yield some indication of the relative 
efficiency of allocation before and after such changes in the institutional 
factors. The annual rental price of water (real terms) was deemed most 
appropriate for this purpos e . 
Reliability of the measures used in this analysis was determined 
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by applying various tests of significance. The three statistical 
techniques employed were a multiple regression analysis, a test of 
the difference between means, and a co-variance analysis. The two 
latter techniques were somewhat repetitious, but served to confirm 
each other. 
The extent or cost of misallocation for the area was determined 
by capitalizing the differential in rental price occurring between alternative 
allocative arrangements. 
SOURCES OF DATA 
Accurate historical data concerning market allocation of water 
were considered vital to the success of this endeavor. For this reason, 
the geographic scope of this study was limited to the Delta area in Utah 
where data of this nature were available. 
Both primary and secondary sources of data were utilized. 
The principal primary sources included the records of the following: 
irrigation companies on both upper and lower Sevier River, the Millard 
County Assessor, the Millard County Recorder, the Millard County Soil 
Conservation Office, the Delta Farmers Home Administration Office, 
and the Office of the State Engineer. Other primary data were acquired 
by personal interview with farmers, irrigation company officers, river 
commissioners, bankers and lawyers who were familiar with the problems 
pertinent to this study. 
The secondary sources included publications dealing with soil, 
climate, agricultural production, prices, irrigation and historical 
features of the study area. Included among these were several bulletins 
and articles published by the Utah State Agricultural Experiment Station, 
the United States Department of Agriculture, and the United States 
Department of Labor. 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
A review of all the literature pertinent to water resources would 
be a very formidable task. In keeping with the objectives of the study, 
this review has been limited to a few carefully selected publications which 
are concerned with allocative efficiency. 
Hirshleifer, et al. (10, p. 32-73) present a very lucid description 
of water supply and give an application of economic theory to water allo-
cation. Their discussion is limited to "existing water supplies", an 
abstraction which serves to clarify their argument. 
They begin their discussion by defining supply and establishing 
the existing supply as a scarce good. This is followed by an application 
of economic theory to determine whether alternative allocation pro-
positions are desirable or undesirable. Care is exercised to point 
out the difference between efficiency and distribution effects and the 
position of economics in relation to these questions. The remainder 
of the discussion is concerned with existing water allocative practices, 
illustrating both correct applications and violations of economic principles . 
Water supply is said to consist of recurring annual flows resu~ting 
from the hydrologic cycle, stocks in storage and water which may be 
reused. Existing water supply is defined as that part of the above 
mentioned supply for which man has developed utilization systems. 
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Possible difficulties in interpretation of the concept of existing 
supplies include the following: (a) Fluctuations in annual and seasonal 
precipitation introduce variability over time to the nation as a whole 
and more so for a given locality; (b) Withdrawal from stocks may be 
at a rate greater than the rate of recharge; (c) Locality, seasonality, 
quality, etc., establish water as something less than a perfectly inter-
changeable commodity; (d) Water used directly without using human 
diversion facilities is excluded and is a part of existing supplies; (e) 
Double counting is possible where multiple use occurs, i.e., water is 
withdrawn, discharged, and reused. 
Competition for the use of nature's resources is said to be an 
obvious fact of life. If the amount of a resource employed in one use 
is increased, there will be a lesser amount available for other uses . 
If an additional quantity of water is diverted for irrigation or municipal 
uses, downstream uses s.uch as navigation and power production may be 
impaired. Lower stream flow may cause pollution problems which will 
have an adverse affect on fish and wildlife, thus affecting recreational 
uses. Where water is pumped from a common aquifer, an increase in 
withdrawal by one user will directly affect the quantity available and 
costs of the other users. 
Other types of competition cited include regional, such as Upper 
Basin versus Lower Basin on the Colorado River, and present versus 
future use of nonrenewable stocks. 
11 
Needs for water are indefinitely expandable and there will 
always be competition for the use of existing supplies. Attempts 
to eliminate competition by assigning the allocation problem to 
politicians or administrators merely shift competition from the market 
place into the political arena. 
Granted that competition exists, economics is the science most 
appropriate for evaluating alternative allocative propositions. The 
economic effects of any proposal can be divided into two possible 
categories. These are "effie iency" and "distribution" effects. 
Economics can show us how to attain efficiency in allocation; also 
something of the distributional consequences of alternative possible 
policies, or institutional arrangements, but stops short of telling us 
how to distribute any gains from increased effie iency. This is a 
question left to the branch of philosophy known as ethics. 
In allocating a scarce resource, economic efficiency is charac-
terized by what Hirshleifer, et al. call the principle of "equimarginal 
value in use." The maximum amount of resources (dollars) a consumer 
is willing to pay in order to obtain a unit of water is said to be the "value 
in use" of that uni.t of water. The "marginal" value in use is said to 
be the "value in use" of the last unit of water consumed. 
The principle of "equimarginal value in use" then, is that the 
resource (water) should be so allocated that the value in use of the 
marginal unit is equal for all consumers or users of the resource in 
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question. Should a disparity in the marginal value exist between users, 
it will be mutually advantageous for both users if the resource moves 
from the use of lower value to that of higher value, resulting in a gain 
in efficiency. When no mutually advantageous exchanges are possible 
between any pairs of persons desiring the resource, it is said to be an 
efficient allocation. 
It is suggested that an institutional arrangement with well-defined 
property rights where free trading is permitted will lead to an efficient 
allocation. Given these conditions, the market price of a specified right 
to water should tend to the marginal value in use of those users in the 
market. Market price measures marginal value in use to its consumers 
for any commodity in which free trading is permitted and perfect rights 
may be conveyed. If for some reason trading is restricted or conditional, 
an efficient allocation will have been prevented. 
Within the context of equimarginal value in use, Hirshleifer, et al., 
lists two rules of behavior which are necessary for an efficient allocation, 
irrespective of institutional arrangement. The first, if rights to water 
are vested as property, there should be no restriction on purchase and 
sale of such rights, so long as third parties are not affected. This 
was discussed above. The second, if water is sold, the price should 
be equal for all customers. This is inferred in the discussion above 
where the statement of equimarginal value in use is said to characterize 
a situation in which the marginal value in use, for all users is equal. 
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Further, i.t was inferred that the marginal values in use, under the 
assumption of free transfer and perfect title, tended toward the price 
of the resource subject to allocation. If the marginal values in use are 
equal, and these in turn approximate the selling price of the resource, 
then, the price of the resource to all users should also be equal. 
In practice, a number of limitations are imposed on a voluntary 
exchange of water rights. Examples cited include the attachment of water 
to a specific tract of land, transfers subject to the approval of an adminis-
trative agency, and legal codes which establish priority of uses. Any 
restriction such as these upon free transfer and disposition of the 
resource, whether restricted with regard to place, purpose or transfer 
to other persons interfere with market processes and preclude a more 
efficient a llocation. 
With the exception of adequate protection of the rights of third 
parties, Hirshleifer, et al., find little reason to support the imposition 
of these restrictions to transfer. They intimate that third parties are 
often overprotected, priorities are often a one-way street especially 
where condemnation proceedings are applicable , and court definitions of 
"reasonable use" to prevent waste, at best, could only accomplish the 
same objectives as the market processes. 
Gaffney (7) presents a vivid des cription of diseconomies in resource 
use (water) which may result from institutional rigidities. An example 
is drawn from a case study of the Kaweah River system in Tulare County, 
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California. 
Gaffney begins by describing apparent diseconomies found through-
out the river system. Included among these are the following : (a) There 
is a strong indication of wide dispersion of marginal revenue productivi.ties 
of water; (b) Annual variability in supply is greater for the individual 
diversions than the natural variability for the whole system; (c) There 
is considerable excess diversion capacity and overlapping of service areas; 
(d) Conveyance losses are considerable and vary greatly between systems; 
(e) There is inadequate reuse of water; (f) Unwarranted segregation of 
streams has resulted in greater losses. 
Gaffney then evaluates the role of water law in perpetuating these 
diseconomies. This is done by listing numerous examples from the 
Kaweah system where institutional rigidities have prevented a more 
efficient use of the water supply. 
Diseconomies are said to be associated with water law in the 
following respects: (a) Productivity is not the initial bas is of water 
rights. Law recognizes time and location; (b) Once a right is established, 
water users are isolated from social opportunity costs; (c) Allegations 
of transferability are not supported by any general demonstrations in 
practice; (d) Transfers actually achieved have been severely hampered 
by legal impositions involving points of diversion; (e) Excess water 
available to holders of riparian and correlative rights are by law 
completely nontransferable; (f) Sale of surplus water from a right 
15 
contingent upon "beneficial use" could be interpreted to mean that the 
surplus never was used beneficially, therefore it should revert directly 
to other junior appropriators; (g) Third parties are often overprotected. 
Settlement is not necessarily limited to the amount of actual damage. 
The remainder of the paper is concerned with what Gaffney 
satirically entitles the dynamic evolution shaped by water law. 
Water law tends to reinforce other economic and political pressures, 
which result in premature overdevelopment. Gaffney characterizes legal 
perception of economic values as resembling the near-sighted Mr . Magoo. 
It responds to the general outline of things, however inappropriately. 
The tendency of legal response has been to present a stonewall of 
disapproval upon inexpensive local adjustments, thus accentuating the 
necessity for interregional transfers. This attitude has materially 
accelerated the move toward heavily subsidized interregional transfers 
while existing local supplies continue to be used L'lefficiently. 
The large increment of water usually required for a successful 
import project results in a cycle of overdevelopment. Lagging private 
development on project-served lands encourage more starts than the 
market can ultimately absorb . 
Gardner (9) presents a discussion of allocative efficiency in 
' 
publicly owned grazing. Because of the apparent similarities between 
grazing permits and water rights, a review of the methodology should 
be helpful. 
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The technique employed in determining allocative efficiency rests 
upon the assumption that a perfectly competitive market can be used as 
the optimum allocating device. Under this assumption, the equilibrium 
price of a specified service should be the same for all users and equal 
to the value of the marginal product derived from that service. Whether 
or not misallocation is indicated becomes a matter of determining if 
significant differences exist between the selling price and the expected 
value of the marginal product derived from that service. 
This problem becomes somewhat more complicated when applied 
to grazing permits. Grazing services are sold at administered prices by 
government agencies . Prices are often set below the expected value of 
the margina l return. This results in the permit taking on a value some-
what greater than the purchase price. This is not necessarily a market 
value, but represents the value in use to the permit holder. If permits 
are transferable, the selling price should approximate the cap italized 
value of the difference between the administered price and the value of 
the marginal product derived from the permit. 
Gardner measures the extent of misallocation by determining the 
difference, per unit of service, between the value of the marginal return 
as measured by a net price paid for comparable private grazing services, 
and the administered prices for public grazing. Mter incorporating an 
expectation model to account for uncertainty, this difference is capitalized 
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and compared with the market price of permits. If the selling price 
of the permit is less than this capitalized value, it is evidence of 
misallocation. 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCEPTUAL 
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM 
Theoretical Framework 
When a resource, such as water, is scarce, an allocative scheme 
which enables society to obtain a maximum social product or utility from 
that resource is usually considered to be most desirable. The problem 
then becomes one of finding criteria or common measure by means of 
which alternative allocation possibilities can be evaluated. 
Economic theory postulates certain schema pertinent to allocation 
which describe the necessary conditions to attain a maximum product from 
a given quantity of resource. Assuming that the perfectly competitive 
market can be used as the optimum allocating device, and that social 
product and private product are equal, an application of economic theory 
can be quite helpful in providing qualified answers to these questions. 
-1 
Within the contest of this abstraction, the supply to the market 
can be assumed to be fixed. Individuals desiring quantities of the resource 
greater than they presently hold may obtain them only by bidding away 
existing supplies from other individuals now holding the resource. Units 
of the resource will move from one use or user to another any time the 
marginal social product or the expected marginal social product is greater 
when employed by the second alternative. These mutually beneficial adjust-
ments or exchanges will continue until the marginal social product of an 
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identical resource is equal for all users in the market. When this 
equilibrium position is attained, the supply price, usually in dollars, 
for a unit of the resource will approximate the value of the marginal 
social product for that quantity of the resource. These two propositions 
may be expressed symbolically as: 
MSPx:: MSPy, = MSPn ~ 1 and (MSP . Psp) = Pr, 
~- ~ ~ 
Where: 
MSP : marginal social product, 
P = the market price, 
r the resource employed, 
sp :: the social product, 
x, y, ••. , n: specific uses or users. 
Where x and y are the only uses or users of the resource, maximum 
social productivity at varying levels of resource use is depected in 
Figure 1. This assumes that prices of the aggregate output or benefit 
derived from the resource are constant. The maximum return positions 
are at F, F', and F", depending on the level of resource use. Where 
the rate of substitution between the possible uses or users is equal to 
the output price ratio, the cost of foregoing the use of one unit of the 
resource in Y is just equal to the return from that unit when employed 
in X. Assuming that the resource is infinitely divisible, any point a long 
the expansion path from F to F" represents the most efficient allocation 
y 
F" 
20 
Expansion path 
Iso return or 
benefit lines 
Iso resource 
line 
Figure 1. Graph depicts a most efficient allocation among competing uses 
at varying levels of resource use where X and Y are the only 
alternative uses. 
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for that level of resource. 
Figure 2 shows the maximum quantity of resource which can 
profitably be absorbed into a particular use or by a particular user. 
Equilibrium is attained at point E where P r interesects the value of the 
marginal social product function. It is at this point that the cost of 
procuring the last unit of resource is just equal to the value of the resulting 
increase in social product and (MSP . Pspl = P r· 
Throughout this discussion it has been assumed that the pricing 
mechanism yielded an adequate indication of the desires of society and 
that social benefits or utility derived from a resource could be expressed 
in dollar terms. In a situation where a resource price is an administered 
price or no market price has been established, it may be necessary to use 
choice indicators other than price. However, this does not invalidate the 
market mechanism as a means of determining allocative efficiency. Rather, 
the problem becomes one of finding other nonmarket indicators which lend 
themselves to an application of traditional economic theory (8). 
It was assumed that the water market in the study area was 
sufficiently competitive to allow the average seasonal rental price per acre 
foot of water to be the choice indicator of the value placed on that quantity 
of water. Although the size of the market area and prevailing conditions 
within the market have been somewhat variable over time, this assumption 
was not considered especially heroic because there is very little evidence, 
if any, of uses whose valuation would not be reflected in this market price. 
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VMP = MSP . Psp 
r 
Figure 2. Graph illustrating maximum quantity of a resource that can 
profitably be absorbed by a particular use or user. 
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Water is an intermediate good in most instances and is used almost 
entirely as an input factor in the production of field crops. 
Within the market area, the marginal cost of water to each 
farmer is essentially equal. Each farmer is assumed to be able to buy 
any quantity of water which he might need at the prevailing market price. 
The action of one farmer will not exert a discernable affect on the price 
of water or product prices. 
Conceptual Solution 
The perfectly competitive market was considered an appropriate 
model for evaluating the performance of two alternative allocative schemes 
which have been used in the study area. Relatively free market conditions 
have existed in this area for many years. Records of the companies indicate 
a history of 30 to 40 years of rental and sale of irrigation company stock. 
Early residents indicate that "trades" were common practice even before 
for mal records were cons ide red necessary. 
For the purpose of this study, the water resource was regarded as 
that limited part of the total physical quantity of water which possess 
utility for irrigation purposes under utilization systems presently found 
in the study area. This does not preclude an expansion of the supply in 
the future, nor does it cast any reflection on other uses not considered 
here. It merely serves to restrict the means of controlling the hydrological 
cycle to those which are currently in operation. Our purpose was to abstract 
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from the real world situation in order to gain some insight concerning 
allocation and possible utilization of a fixed supply without the added 
complication of considering the development of new supplies. 
From the foregoing, it is deduced that a given supply of irrigation 
water should be allocated such that the value of the marginal product should 
be equal among all users. Further, the market price of a specified unit 
of water should approximate the value of the marginal product derived 
from the use of that quantity of water. 
The determinant of supply and demand for water could be expected 
to influence the market price of a specified unit of water. A priori the 
total quantity of water available to the area appears to be an important 
variable on the supply side. The demand side appears to be influenced by 
the level of technology, the prices and quantities of other productive services 
which may be used as substitutes or in combination with water, and the prices 
of products produced by water. 
The price of water may be further influenced on the side of both 
supply and demand by the institutions which determine a llocation among 
users. In order to determine the relative efficiency of alternative allocative 
policies, as measured by changes in the price of water, the influence on 
water price of all factors other than the change in allocative policy must 
be held constant. 
Assuming that all expectations concerning the supply and demand 
determinants affecting water prices could be held constant over time, then 
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the price of water could also be expected to remain constant. Should a 
given change in pertinent water institutions be accompanied by a significant 
change in the price of water, there would be evidence that selected changes 
in the institutions have an affect on the efficiency of water allocation. 
Depending upon the magnitude and direction of this response, it should 
be possible to determine whether that affect is favorable or unfavorable. 
A more efficient allocation is indicated by a higher price, a less efficient 
by a lower price. 
An approximation of the net gain or loss which would accrue to 
society is obtained by capitalizing the product of the difference between 
the per unit prices associated with any two allocative arrangements and 
the tota l units of water available to the market area. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA 
Physical Description 
The Delta area is located in the west-central part of the State 
of utah, approximately 140 miles south and west of Salt Lake City. It 
lies in the northeastern corner of Millard County and i.s a part of the 
Sevier Desert. The total land area comprises approximately 180 square 
miles or 115, 000 acres. Area tilled and irrigated appears to vary from 
35 to 60 percent of this amount or from 40, 000 to 80, 000 acres (12) . 
Topography of the area is generally smooth with slopes ranging 
from less than 5 up to 20 feet per mile. The surface elevation ranges from 
about 4, 565 to 4, 650 feet (17). 
The climate of the Delta area is definitely arid as the mean annual 
percipitation is less than 8 inches. Summer rains occur only infrequently 
and are inadequate for most types of crop production. Seasonal temperatures 
vary from over 100 de grees during the summer months to -15 de grees in 
winter. Killing frosts usually occur in early September but have been 
known to occur as much as three weeks earlier . The last killing frosts 
in spring usually come late. in May. Frosts during the growing season do 
occur infrequently but are not a serious element of uncertainty. Hot 
spring and summer winds are common. These have an adverse affect 
on soil moisture and can be injur ious to various hay and seed crops (17). 
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Soils consist of alluvial materials deposited in main part by 
the Sevier River as its waters entered the ancient Lake Bonneville. 
Disposition of soil types is wide and varied, apparently owing to sizable 
fluctuations in the level of this lake. Texture of the soils ranges from 
slick clays to dune sand, the clay types being most prevalent. Soluable 
salts are present in varying concentrations throughout the area. 
Meticulous irrigation and drainage practices are necessary to prevent 
serious alkali problems from developing (17). Acreage of different soil 
types are shown in Table 1. 
As is intimated above, irrigation is a prerequisite for crop pro-
duction. Irrigation waters are derived from mountain and desert water-
sheds to the east and south. These enter the area via the natural course 
of the Sevier River. During the period 1934 to 19 63, the annual water 
supply has varied between 58, 233 and 151, 235 acre feet. The mean annual 
delivery for this same period was 115, 006 acre feet. In order to augment 
and stabilize the water supply, rather extensive storage and diversion 
facilities have been constructed along the course of this river. These 
have a combined storage capacity of approximately 250, 000 acre feet. 
Except in periods of prolonged drought, these facilities serve admirably 
for their intended purpose. 
Crops well suited to the area under irrigation include alfalfa for 
hay and seed, and small grains. At the present time, 80 to 90 percent 
of the irrigated acreage is in alfalfa. Sugar beets and potatoes could 
also be grown given a more adequate supply of water. Some idea of land 
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Table 1. Acreage of different soils, Delta Area (12) 
Soil Number of acres Percent 
Oasis clay 28,480 24.7 
Gordon clay 12, 992 
Friable phase 1, 856 13.2 
Slick phase 384 
Oasis silty clay 
Loam 14, 400 
Light-textured bench phase 448 12.9 
Oasis fine sandy loam 13, 440 
Bench phase 128 11.8 
Abbot clay 8, 960 
Silty phase 3, 136 10.5 
Cache silty loam 11, 392 9.9 
Woodrow clay loam 9,024 7.8 
Woodrow clay 5, 376 4.7 
Lynndyl gravelly sandy loam 1, 856 1.6 
Cache loam 1, 408 1.2 
Lahontan clay loam 1,344 1.2 
Dune sand 512 . 4 
Rough stony land 64 . 1 
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use can be obtained by observing the data for Millard County in Table 2. 
Roughly two-thirds of these totals can be attributed to the Delta area. 
The economy of the Delta area is dependent almost entirely upon 
the income derived from agricultural sources. The two largest sources 
of income are alfalfa seed and livestock (22). In both cases, the production 
of these products is either directly or indirectly dependent upon irrigation. 
Hence, the allocation of irrigation water is a problem of primary importance 
to the economy of the Delta area. 
Development 
A brief description of the settlement and development of Mormon 
communities in general should be helpful in evaluating the subsequent 
institutions which pertain specifically to the Delta area. 
Settlement and construction of irrigation facilities 
The first permanent settlement in the Delta area was established 
in 1860. As was the case in all of Utah and in limited areas in surrounding 
states, this settlement was effected by Mormon families selected specifically 
for that purpose by the authorities of the Latter-Day Saints Church. These 
colonization efforts by the Mormons were communal in nature, being planned 
and directed by the Church authorities. Companies of settlers were usually 
limited to those groups large enough to supply the labor necessary for 
construction of the various essential fixtures, and to discourage attacks 
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Table 2. Land use in Millard County (22) 
Percent Total for Percent 
Irrigated of whole of 
Land use farms total county total 
Number of farms 768 905 
Land in farms (acres) 533, 662 100.00 593,390 100.00 
Acres of cropland 163, 499 175,850 
Cropland harvested 81, 425 15.26 84, 165 14. 18 
Hay 39, 762a 45, 875b 
Corn 3, 162a 3, 179b 
Small grains 15, 311a 27,403b 
Alfalfa seed 21, 285a 24, 577b 
Irish potatoes 35oa 350b 
Sugar beets 319a 319b 
Other 32a 51b 
Cropland used only for 
pasture 31,754 5.95 3 5, 438 5.97 
Cropland not harvested 
and not pastured 50,320 9.43 56, 247 9. 48 
Woodlands 12,980 2.40 14, 225 2.40 
Other pasture 334, 377 62.66 379,209 63.91 
Other land (lots, roads, 
waste) 22,806 4.30 24, 106 4.06 
Total land irrigated 75, 793 75, 793 
Irrigated cropland harvested 68, 016 68, 016 
Other irrigated land (not 
cropland harvested) 7, 777 7, 777 
a and bThese do not sum to A. Cropland harvested because of double 
counting hay and alfalfa seed acreage. 
31 
by hostile Indians. Families "called" or selected usually owned or were 
supplied with the necessary implements, livestock, seed, etc . , making 
the group as nearly self-sufficient as was possible. Upon arrival at the 
proposed site of settlement, building a fort, platting the townsite, erecting 
fences, clearing fields, and building the irrigation facilities were a ll 
accomplished by community effort under the direction of the bishop (11, 
p. 9-13). 
This communal approach to colonization was undeniably successful 
and probably the only means by which the desert could have been conquered 
at that time. However, certain inefficiencies were inherent in the system 
with regard to land and water use. Projects were small of necessity 
because there was dire need for quick development and immediate returns. 
Ditches were cons tructed where diversion was most easily accomplished 
with little thought of potential development of either land or water. Know-
ledge essential for the construction of efficient irrigation systems was st ill 
in the developmental stages and much of the construction equipment was 
improvised and crude. 
AB the settlements grew and new lands were required to support the 
population, old ditches were extended and increased in size. The next step, 
in many areas, was to build parallel facilities at higher and higher levels 
which could supply the less convenient bench lands. The result of this 
short-run policy was a maze of duplicate ditches, diversion facilities and 
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management personnel in areas where ore well-designed facility could 
have provided service to all users in a more efficient manner. In many 
a reas, this sporadic period of growth resulted in greater losses of water, 
water-logging of fertile low landf! higher maintenance costs, management 
problems, and it increased the possibility of conflicts between users. It 
should be recognized that these seemingly important factors were proba bly 
considered mere trivia to the Mormon pioneer who faced starvation during 
the first winter i.f immediate returns were sacrificed for future efficiency. 
Ownership of land was usually limited to small parcels in an effort 
to discourage speculation and to encourage a more intensive agriculture. 
It also tended to localize the population while at the same time it encouraged 
a more uniform social order and reduced the threat of Indian harassment. 
Where settlers shared equally in initiating the community, ownership of 
property within the townsite was determined by drawing lots. Other lands 
were apportioned somewhat arbitrarily, usually in accordance with need 
and abil ity to give proper care to the land. In both cases, a proportionate 
share of the community water supply was assumed to accompany the 
entitlement to land. In other instances, the amount of land granted was 
proportional to the amount of labor contributed in the development of a 
water supply, or conversely, obligation of labor toward the construction 
and maintenance of the irrigation system was dependent upon the size of 
the land holding. Ownership rights to land and water use thus acquired, 
were later recognized by the State of Deseret, the Territory of Utah, 
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and by the United States Government (11, p. 14-15). 
From earliest times the building, maintenance, and management 
of the various water systems had been subject to the direction of the local 
church authority or his appointee and were an integral part of the 
ecclesiastical regimen. However, as settlements became more firmly 
established and the people attained a reasonable degree of security, a 
cleavage developed between the religious and the secular organizations. 
Control of the water supply appears to have been among the first segments 
of community life to have been affected. Intuitively, this should have 
resulted following an influx of nonmembers who did not accept the authority 
of the Church or its leaders, but this did not prove to be the case. Local 
members usually provided the impetus for change (11). 
Prior to the establishment of civil government, it became customary 
in many settlements for the men of the community to meet regularily, 
in mass, to discuss problems affecting the general welfare of the settle-
ment. These meetings provided an excellent opportunity to usurp the 
power of the Church leaders in secular affairs. They still presided on these 
occas ions, but suffered a considerable diminution in power as questions 
brought before these meetings were usually decided in favor of the con-
census of those present. The establishment of civil government and the 
added influence of increasing numbers of non-Mormons tended to 
crystallize this movement. If the Church authorities continued to wield 
considerable influence in secular matters, it could usually be attributed to 
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reasons other than their position in the Church. 
Institutions 
Early water organizations were very informal. Control by Church 
authorities was replaced by committees or representatives selected by the 
majority of the water users. With the advent of civil government, public 
officials, especially town officers, became the heir apparent. This was a 
logical secession in the typical Mormon community where almost all persons 
lived within the confines of the town. The interests of the city dwellers no 
doubt coincided with those who worked and irrigated the farms because 
they were the same people. As the towns grew, conflicts of interest 
developed between urban and rural users. The usual result of such con-
flicts was a realignment of the user groups, each one sympathetic to its 
own divergent interests (11, p. 16-27). This gradual transition of control 
and refinement of purposes in the various water user groups plus the 
application of a formal legal structure gave rise to several of the more 
formal water institutions which have carried over to the present. 
Many features of early water law and custom in Utah foreshadowed 
current appropriative doctrL>1e. In 1852, the first territorial legislature 
declared that natural resrurces, including water, were property of the 
public and were to be administered by the county courts. As is intimated 
above, ownership of land, water, and ditches were closely assoc.iat ed. 
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Water was not readily transferable and was usually considered to be a 
part of the land. The right was acquired by development and use, and 
water could be used on lands not necessarily bordering the initial source 
of supply. Water institutions in Utah were unique in that they were 
generated in an agricultural economy, whereas the institutions of other 
arid states were borrowed from the laws and customs of the miners . 
Agricultural use of water outside utah was incidental until much later 
(13, p. 220-241). 
Unique Features of the Delta Area 
Development in the Delta area was similar in most respects to 
the remainder of Utah, but differs in certain important respects. Fore-
most among these was the difficulty encountered in making diversion from 
the Sevier River and its subsequent affect on the type of development to 
occur. Most settlements made prior to this time were accomplished on 
small streams where relatively little effort and material were needed to 
effectively divert irrigation water into a canal. The usual diversion 
facility was constructed of a few well placed cottonwood trees, rock and 
native hay. 
Diversion in the Delta area was not so easily accomplished. Brush 
and rock dams, even solid earthen dams, were repeatedly undermined and 
washed away owing to the erosive nature of the soil. After repeated 
failures, the first attempt to settle was abandoned. It was apparent 
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that the usual methods of diversion would not be successful in this area. 
In order to justify a more elaborate facility capable of effecting 
diversion under these adverse circumstances, the project would necessarily 
be larger, and require more labor and materials. When settlement was 
attempted a second time in 1860, it was by a much larger group. It was 
decided to build a dam of solid rock. This rock fill was extended well 
into the river banks and pilings were used on the lower side of the dam. 
Diversion was accomplished and several thousand acres of land were soon 
brought under cultivation (4). 
This was the first and last settlement effected by the Latter-Day 
Saints Church, per se, in the Delta area. In 1866, the diversion dam again 
failed and the first of several cooperative irrigation enterprises was begun. 
Reconstruction and subsequent new development after that time were effected 
mainly by Mormon people, but under forms of organization other than the 
Church. The most predominant organization to emerge was the mutual 
irrigation company . The rather active communal spirit imparted by the 
Church, the aura of common interest, plus the advent of user control of 
the water delivery systems provided a natural basis for the development 
of the mutual company. Although mutual irrigation companies were common 
in other parts of the state, the rather unique problems involved in the Delta 
area gave rise to much larger organizations. The four mutual companies 
which have emerged in that area have approximately 80, 000 acres under 
their canal systems, an average of 20, 000 acres per company (22). This 
is more than ten times as large as the average company in the state. This 
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feature alone went far in reducing some of the inefficiencies mentioned 
above which are associated with the smaller systems. 
Organizations of this type were better suited for acquiring the 
capital needed for the construction of extensive irrigation facilities 
essential for the development of the Delta area. In addition, they 
afforded much greater flexibility in water use. stock ownership entitles 
its owner to a specified portion of the water in the system, which can 
be used on any land which can be reached by that company' s system, and 
may be sold or rented if the owner does not need it. There are no restric-
tions as to the area within the canal system upon which this water may be 
used; its owner uses his judgment in that matter (13, p. 235, 23 6) . 
In summary, the Delta area was settled by Mormon families who 
were accustomed to working together for a common purpose. Policies 
regarding use of water reflected its dear qualities and in many respects 
resembled present day appropriative doctrine. The usual transition of 
control of the water supply experienced in other parts of the state was 
greatly abbreviated in the Delta area. Substantially greater labor and 
material requirements needed to develop a water supply necessitated a 
more extensive development than had heretofore been the case. Although 
initial development was abortive and more costly, many of the problems 
associated with the smaller developments in other parts of the state were fore 
gone . The primary organization to emerge was the mutual irrigation 
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company . Policies associated with these organizations led to much 
greater flexibility in water use. 
Other unique features found in the Delta area such as type of 
rights, location of land with respect to supply, flexibility of control, 
and third party affects will be considered in detail in the following 
section. 
THE WATER MARKET 
The reliability of many of the measures used in this analysis 
hinges upon the assumption that a market for water rights does exist, 
and that the market price for a specified quantity of water is a good 
approximation of the value of the marginal product derived from that 
quantity of water. This initiates query as to the degree of competition, 
homogeneity of product and factors, flexibility of water movement, and 
the state of lmowledge associated with the study area. For this reason, 
a description of the water market in the study area was considered an 
essential part of the analysis. 
In economics, a market is often described as a group of individuals, 
buyers, and sellers of a particular product, with facilities for trading 
with each other. In Utah, several rather distinct markets have developed 
which tend to coincide with this description. A survey of irrigation 
companies in the Sevier River Basin reveals that 90 percent of the 
respondents have some approximation of a market where water rights 
are exchanged between buyer and seller. Transfers are of three general 
types: (a) Sale of water rights on a stream for changing point of 
diversion, (b) sale of irrigation company stocks, and (c) rental of 
water or of irrigation company stocks. 
In a majority of these cases, the market is quite inactive. Sales 
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are initiated only under extreme circumstances such as death of the 
owner, sheriffs' sales, etc. However, in a few selected areas the 
water market is very active. This is especially true in areas where 
water can be rented either seasonally or on a per unit basis. The study 
area is a notable example of thi.s latter group. 
Factors Contributing Toward the 
Development of a Market 
There are a number of factors which appear to contribute toward 
the development of a workable market for irrigation water. Included 
among these are the following: 
1. The supply is sufficiently scarce to make transfers between 
users desirable; i.e., water must be a scarce "economic commodity; 
2. The laws and customs governing irrigation water use wi.ll 
accommodate transfers between users; 
3. The water supply is of such quality, locality, and seasonality 
that any part of the total supply is readily substitutable for any other part. 
Not all of the above mentioned conditions are similar in areas 
where markets have developed and the presence of these factors is no 
guarantee that a market exists or may develop. However, these are 
the factors most often associated with areas where operable water markets 
have developed. 
Scarcity 
Transfers become desirable any time the cost of developing new 
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supplies is greater than the consideration required to attract a similar 
quantity of the existing supply . Perhaps a more relevant question is the 
relative scarcity of water to each individual within a group dependent 
upon a fixed supply. Here transfer is desirable any time a disparity 
occurs in the marginal valuation placed on a given quantity of water by 
different users. This ignores third party effects which will be discussed 
below, but generally, it can be stated that any time an individual in a 
probable market area desires a quantity of water to such extent that he 
is willing to compensate other persons now holding the right to water in 
an amount which will induce them to give up a unit voluntarily, transfer 
is desirable. 
A uniform distribution of supplies per acre or per user, does not 
lessen the need of transfers between users; in fact, it increases it. Soils, 
crops, choice of other inputs, and managerial ability, a ll of which may 
have a substantial effect on the value of the marginal product of water are 
not usually distributed evenly. Varying combinations of these elements 
will necessitate some adjustments in the amount of water allocated to 
each user if value of the marginal product is to be equal among all users. 
Thus when supplies are scarce and other inputs are variable, it appears 
that transfer would be desirable. 
In the study a rea, irrigation water supplies are definitely limited. 
Total water available at the farm for each season and water available per 
irrigated acr e are listed in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Water available for use at the farm, 1950-1964 
Total Water available per 
water irrigated acreb 
Year availablea Acre feet Acre inches 
1950 92, 693.2 1. 8168 21.8 
1951 71, 111.2 1. 3938 16. 7 
1952 114, 371.9 2.2417 26.9 
1953 113, 521.0 2. 2250 26.7 
1954 70, 266.8 1. 3772 16.5 
1955 71, 178. 5 1. 3951 16.7 
1956 48,170.0 .9441 11.3 
1957 49, 564.9 • 9715 11. 7 
1958 94,260.5 1.8475 22.2 
1959 72, 096.3 1. 4131 17.0 
1960 52, 686. 4 1. 0327 12.4 
1961 42, 086. 5 .8249 9.9 
1962 74,716.0 1. 4644 17. 6 
1963 44, 945. 5 • 8809 10. 6 
1964 53,333.5 1. 0454 12.5 
a An aggregate of credit per share multiplied by shares outstanding. 
bAcreage is based upon County Assessor' s records, 1965. 
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From 1950 through 1964, the average quantity available per 
irrigated acre was 16.7 acre inches with standard deviation 5. 4 acre 
inches. Figures on consumptive usE! for a similar area in central Utah 
list the following annual consumptive use for ma jor field crops: alfalfa, 
35.4 inches; corn, 21.2 inches; sugar beets, 26.4 inches ; wheat, 22. 4 
inches ; other small grains, 20. 7 inches; and potatoes, 21.0 inches (5). 
A comparison of these consumptive use requirements with the water 
available at the farm, serves to emphasize the degree of scarcity . 
Certainly if stringent supply provides an impetus for the development of 
a market, this requirement is fully satisfied in the study area. 
Water law and local custom 
Water law and local custom are factors which can either enhance 
or restrict the development of a water market. Generally, water laws 
tend to reflect economic pressures; however, position action is sometimes 
delayed to the point that it does little to expedite transfers (7). Local 
customs appear to be endowed with an inertia which tends to perpetuate 
accepted practices. This is not surprising, because specific and reliable 
evidence of monetary benefits is extremely scarce. It seems perfectly 
rationa l for water users to maintain the status quo when evidence is 
inconclusive and only suggests betterment (18). 
In order for any ma rket transfer arrangement to work satisfactorily, 
water rights must be secure and sufficiently well defined by law so that 
the product may be positively identified and rights conveyed to subsequent 
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owners. Provisions for changing ownership, point of diversion, place of 
use, and character of use should be maintained subject only to the adequate 
protection of third parties (10). 
Basically there are two types of security considerations pertinent 
to water. The first involves legal certainty or security of tenure and 
the second physical certainty. Where water markets are concerned, it 
is this element of legal certainty which is important. Buyers and sellers 
of water should be able to determine without question who owns specifically 
defined rights to water supply. Under the appropriate doctrine, leg-al 
certainty means that prior appropriators are protected against junior 
users, and juniors are protected against increased use by the senior 
right holders (10). 
Physical certainty as such is not dependent on the law, but is 
subject to the laws of nature because droughts, floods, rainfall, etc. are 
not responsive to man-made laws (10). 
Third party effects, or spillover benefits and losses, become a 
serious impediment to transfer only when the definition of the water right 
is incomplete. In a situation where the water is not entirely consumed in 
its initial use and subsequent rights are granted on the basis of return 
flows, identification problems may become very complex. This does not 
reduce the desirability of free transfer, but tends to re-emphasize the 
necessity of finding reliable measures of return flow so that transfers 
can be effected when desirable and third parties can be protected. 
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In the study area, as in all of Utah, the appropriative doctrine 
is the accepted body of water law. All water is declared to be property 
of the public . Rights to the use of unappropriated water are acquired 
on the basis of "first in time, first in right" and are contingent upon 
continuous "beneficial use" (24, 73-1-1, 73-1-3, 73-3-21). Under the 
appropriative doctrine, a water right is generally considered as real 
property . So long as the water flows in the natural water course, rights 
are limited to usufractuary rights or right to use . After diversion from 
the water course, water may be reduced to physical possession and as 
such is considered as personal property of the right holder (10, p. 231). 
It is important to note that mere possession of a water right may not 
guarantee a supply of water to the owner of the right. Prior rights must 
be satisfied before any water accrues to junior right holders. When the 
stream is appropriated in excess of flow or when dry years occur, the 
supply may be such tl:at junior rights must give way to prior right 
holders {24, 73-3-21). 
Under the appropriative system, a water right is not usua lly 
contingent upon the ownership of certain lands. The water right ordinarily 
accompanies the land, but when deed, eparately it may be sold separate 
from the land (24, 73-1-10) - Appurtenance does exist in some cases, 
usually as a by-product of an earlier effort to obtain credit for irrigation 
works. Assignment of the water to specific tracts of land was thought 
to reduce speculation and provide an added degree of security for the 
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investor (19, p. 231-243). In certain cases, these have outlived their 
intended purpose and now serve only as a barrier to flexibility. 
General provisions in Utah water law with regard to changing 
ownership, point of diversion, and place and character of use appear to 
accommodate flexibility in water use in most respects (25). As is pointed 
out above, a water right, subject to certain limitations, may be treated 
as any other real property. Thus, any of the foregoing changes may be 
accomplished provided the limitation is not unsurmountable. However, 
problems associated with water right identification and third party effects 
are not always resolved. The possibi.li.ty of involvement in litigation and 
the inconvenience and uncertainty of having to submit proposals of change 
to an administrative agency or the courts for approval might have a 
dampening effect on transfers (2). 
In the study area, much has been done to positively identify water 
rights. In 193 6, the Fifth Judicial District Court in Millard County 
rendered a decree adjudicating all rights along the Sevier River. Four 
mutual irrigation companies, which service all of the study area, control 
the water rights for the irrigation of about half of the irrigated lands 
along the Sevier River (4). Within these companies the various water 
rights accorded under the appropriative law, with their varying priorities, 
have been maintained in order to satisfy legal requirements and to 
apportion yearly supply among the four companies. The usual confusion 
and litigation ordinarily associated with water rights is minimal, apparently 
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owing in large part to the small number of claimants involved and their 
long history of collective endeavor. 
Further complication involving return flows i.s virtually nonexistent 
because of the location and topography of the study area. Virtually all of 
the water entering the area is consumed. The Sevier River follows the 
highest contour of the Sevier Desert area. Surface strata slope away from 
the river, thus return flows are negligible. Water which may run off is 
collected in artificial drains and is of such poor quality that it is unsuitable 
for further irrigation uses (4). It is evident that transfers in the study 
area encounter fewer obstacles because identification is easier and third 
party affects are at a minimum. 
As is intimated above, community attitude or custom may have con-
siderable affect on eventual development of water markets. In the absence 
of tangible evidence of potential gain, local interests may lack the impetus 
to initiate changes in policy which will benefit the majority of water users . 
In at least one such case, a public agency assumed the responsibility of 
assembling specific and reliable information concerning irrigation company 
activities, and of making recommendations for sound, workable improvementf 
In 1936, the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station completed an 
investigation of the study area. It was a comprehensive study of irrigation 
and drainage, soil, economic and social conditions. In the following 
spring, the Experiment Station, under the direction of 0. W. Israelsen, 
went to the area for the purpose of initiating some of the recommendations 
48 
of this study. 
Foremost among these was a proposal to consolidate all of the 
irrigation compan ies and drainage districts in the area . In spite of what 
appeared to be undeniable evidence in its favor, it met with opposition 
from local irrigation officials. However, all was not lost . In the years 
following, the merits of these proposals became generally known among 
the stockholders of the various companies, with the eventual result that 
most of the major recommendations were initiated by the efforts of the 
local water users (4). 
Homogeneity of the factor 
The quality, locality, and seasonality of water are of extreme 
importance if water is to be transferred successfully between uses . Where 
transfer within a given use is concerned, water quality does not appear to 
be restrictive except in the case of some extremely sensitive crops . 
Generally, water used to irrigate one crop or farm is equally well 
suited for the irrigation of other crops or farms . Quality and location 
may be related to some extent where coveyance from one place to 
another reduces qua lity. However, location is a greater problem because 
of the physical barriers it presents in effecting transfers . Even where 
conveyance facilities exist, losses incurred between places of use may 
prohibit transfer. Even if a specified quantity of water were valued at 
ten dollars in its present use and twenty dollars in its alternative use, 
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there would be little point in transferring it if half of the water were 
lost in conveyance. 
Seasonality of supply may tend to encourage transfer. Where 
both direct flow and storage rights are held by different individuals, 
transfers may have a highly complementary effect upon the supply . 
During the early season when irrigation requirements exceed direct flow, 
transferred s torage water could be used to good advantage by the direct 
flow right holders. Later in the season when storage is depleted and 
river flows increase, it may be advantageous for the storage right holders 
to obtain water from the direct flow right holders. This would have the 
effect of extending the supply over the season and making the water 
available at a time when it is most useful to crops. 
In the study area, water quality is not good. Along the upper 
portion of the river, there are several tight dams, where all the flow is 
diverted. That part of the water not consumed eventually returns to the 
river where it is again diverted for irrig-ation. In this manner the waters 
are used over and over again along the 225 mile extent of this river. This 
complete use is not accomplished without certain negative consequences. 
Each time the water is used, additional quantities of soluable salts are 
retained in solution, thus reducing the quality of the water appreciably. 
However, with adequate drainage, it still can be used successfully for 
the irrigation of all crops commonly grown in the area. 
Locality of water with respect to arable lands is favorable in the 
study area. With the exception of a small amount of underground water, 
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all of the supply enters the area via the Sevier River, such that it can 
be diverted into any of the four systems. All storage water can be used 
by any one of the four companies with the exception of 4, 000 acre feet 
which is sometimes stored in the Gunnison Bend Reservoir. 
The dispersion of irrigable lands favors the concentration of water 
in the Delta vicinity. This allows the water to be used on the best soils 
while at the same time foregoing excessive canal losses which are 
associated with the irrigation of lands farther from the source (23). 
In the study area, the water rights of two of the companies are 
based largely upon direct flow from the r iver, while the remaining two 
are dependent primarily upon storage. Storage is made up of river 
flow for the period October 1 to March 1 of each year. Fall and late 
winter storms favor the storage rights, while spring and summer storms 
favor the direct flow rights. Transfer of water between companies tends 
to reduce variability in supply for all four companies ( 4). 
Operation of the Water Rental Market 
Credits 
The technique employed in handling transfers of water in an 
irrigation company resembles the account ing system of a bank. Each 
year in the early part of April, a water dividend based on reservoir 
storage and anticipated runoff from snowpack, less estimated system 
losses, is announced and credited to the accounts of each of the four 
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companies in accordance with their respective water rights. These 
amounts are then credited to the accounts of the individual shareholders 
in proportion to the amount of stock they hold in the company. If the 
water supply improves, an additional dividend may be declared at a 
later date which is credited in the same manner. Persons responsible 
for making this estimate exercise extreme care because of the ruinous 
situation which can develop if book credits greatly exceed actual supply. 
The individual account of each farmer represents his water supply for 
the season, and he makES his plans accordingly. It would be disconcerting, 
at best; a disaster, at worst, to discover in midseason that the actual 
supply was exhausted when plans based on established water credits called 
for additional irrigation. 
Transfers and "basis of exchange" 
Withdrawals for irrigation and all types of transfer are reflected 
in both the individual accounts and those of the companies. It should be 
noted that not all recorded transfers of water between companies result 
from a rental or purchase of water from another system. Often one land-
owner will have acreage under two or more of these systems. Under these 
circumstances water may move from one system to another with no 
accompanying change in ownership. 
Prior to 1948, only intracompany transfers were permitted. 
Transfer between individuals within the same company was a relatively 
simple matter. The account of the person giving up water was debited 
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and the account of the person receiving water was credited. Following 
a change in policy in 1950, exchanges have been possible on both an 
intracompany and an intercompany basis among all four companies. 
The water credits of any one company may be transferred to the credit 
of any other, subject to the established "basis of exchange. " 
This " basis of exchange" is an amount in addition to the face 
amount to be transferred which is debited to the company giving up the 
water and credited to the company receiving the water. Suppose farmer A 
in company X wishes to rent 10 acre feet of water to farmer Bin company Y. 
Where the common " basis of exchange" is 40 percent, fan~er A will be 
debited for 10 acre feet, company X will be debited for 16. 67 acre feet, 
company Y will be credited with 16. 67 acre feet , and farme r B will be 
credited with 10 acre feet. It is essentially a means of accounting for 
system loss in the various companies; however, it appears rather 
ineffectual when the rate is the same for all companies regardless of 
system losses. If percentage losses in each of the systems were exactly 
the same, there would be little problem in establishing a "basis of 
exchange. " It should be an :tmount just equal to the loss incurred in 
making delivery. 
When losses vary between systems, a common "basis of exchange" 
tends to favor certain companies and discriminate against others depending 
upon · two factors. The first roncerns their losses relative to the "basis 
of exchange", and the second hinges on whether a company is primarily 
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an exporter or an importer of water. Members of a system having 
losses in excess of the accepted "basis of exchange" would suffer if 
substantial quantities of water were rented into the system because the 
"basis of exchange" would not be sufficient to offset actual losses 
incurred in delivery. If the full amount of the transfer is delivered into 
the second system, the supply for that system will be reduced by an 
amount equal to the amount by which system losses exceed the "bas is 
of exchange." Conversely, when the "basis of exchange" is substantially 
greater than actual losses incurred in delivery, all users in the system 
would benefit from a transfer into that company. 
The relative position of each company with respect to the "basis 
of exchange" has some rather obvious implications on the prevailing rental 
price. These will be considered under the discussion of price below. 
In practice, this "basis of exchange" has been set at what appears 
to be an amount at least equal to the greatest·system loss. This would 
allow transfer into any company without adversely affecting the amount 
of water available to other users in that company. A policy on this order 
would favor the importer compary and discriminate against the exporter. 
Every company is wholly compensated for system loss on imported water 
and others having lower system losses should realize a net gain from imports . 
From the perspective of the exporter company, a "basis of exchange" set 
at the highest system loss may be restrictive to transfer. To transfer 
out of the company would cause a net loss to that system of an amount 
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equal to the difference between the "basis of exchange" and the actual 
system losses. 
Accounts showing net intercompany transfers for the years 1951 
through 1962 are shown in Table 4. In this series of years, company B 
shows a marked tendency to export, company C to import. A priori this 
would suggest that more marginal users are associated with company B. 
Although this may be true in other instances, a closer examination of 
this company reveals that its location and water supply relative to 
irrigated acreage within the system proba.bly account for this export 
position. Company B is almost completely surrounded by the other 
companies. Supply to this company per irrigated acre is consistently 
higher than the other companies. Where water supplies are greater 
and the service area cannot be expanded, it seems logical to assume 
that water will move out of this system. 
Company C, the importer, consistently has less water per 
irrigated acre than the other companies. The current "basis of exchange" 
may favor this company as an importer because of reduced system losses 
resulting from canal lining. Under these circumstances, company C could 
be expected to import a greater amount of water. 
Net debits and credits resulting from intercompany transfer in 
the remaining companies appear to be quite random in occurrence. How-
ever, if the water supply for the whole area is compared with the debit-
credit position of each company, a certain pattern can be ascertained. 
When the water supply tends downward, the storage companies initially 
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Table 4. Intercompany transfers for the years 1951 through 1963 
ComEany A Com~an~ B Company C Company D 
Year Export Import Export 1m port Export Import Export Import 
1951 85 680 620 25 
1952 1.011 146 1, 476 2, 633 
1953 
1954 
1955 595 1, 205 187 423 
1956 410 726 376 60 
1957 1, 458 66 594 798 
1958 761 629 166 298 
1959 639 1, 286 1, 516 409 
1960 36 328 21 385 
1961 28 355 431 104 
1962 414 953 659 120 
1963 2,471 615 383 2, 703 
Total 3, 174 4, 734 6, 488 501 1, 046 5, 383 3, 934 4, 024 
Source: Records of the four companies in the Delta Area. 
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become debtors , exporting water to the direct flow companies. If the 
declining trend persists, they tend to move back to the position of a 
creditor and import water . When a recovery in supply begins, the direct 
flow companies tend to become debtors and export to the storage 
companies. 
This is illustrated in Table 5 where the annual water supply for 
the area and the debit-credit positions of company A, a storage company, 
and company D, a direct flow company, are compared. Wi.th but one 
exception, in the period of years 1951 through 1963, the position of the 
s torage company was opposite that of the direct flow compa ny . A marked 
recovery in 1952 saw company D exporting, company A importing; a 
downward movement in supply in 1956 provides the exception; but 
supplies up to that point were probably so stringent that storage was 
already depleted. A r ecovery in 1958, a decline in 1959, a recovery in 
19 62, and a decline in 19 63 all follow the prescribed pattern. 
Where the ''bas is of exchange'' represents an amount that is 
mutually acceptable to a ll of the companies and is subject to revision, 
should it be desired, it seems logical to assume that this figure would 
represent an equilibrium exchange position among the companies. Thus, 
over a period of years including a complete cycle in supply conditions, 
the problems associated with the "basis of exchange" will probably 
average out. 
In the future as water becomes even more scarce than at present, 
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Table 5. Export-import position of typical storage and primary right 
companies under various supply conditions 
Company A Company D 
Year Water available Change in supplya storageb primaryb 
(acre feet) (acre feet) 
1951 71,111.2 (21, 582. 0) 
1952 114,371.9 43, 260. 7 .. 
1953 113, 521.0 (850. 9) 
1954 70, 266.8 (43, 254. 2) 
1955 71,178.5 911.7 
1956 48,170.0 (23, 008. 5) 
1957 49, 564.9 1,394.9 .. 
1958 94, 260. 5 44, 695. 6 .. 
1959 72, 096.3 (22, 164. 2) + 
1960 52, 686.4 (19, 409. 9) + 
1961 42, 086.5 (10, 599. 9) 
1962 74, 716.0 32, 629.5 + 
1963 44, 945. 5 (29, 770. 5) + 
aDecreases in water available are denoted by parentheses ( ). 
b A net export is denoted by ( + ), and a net import is denoted by (-). 
Source : Records of the four companies in the Delta Area. 
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it seems reasonable to assume that much will be done to reduce system 
losses. It may well be that this is one of the cheapest sources of 
additional supply still available to the area. Should system losses be 
substantially reduced and tend to converge at that point where water 
becomes cheaper to secure from other sources, it should help to reduce 
problems associated with intercompany transfer of water, especially the 
"basis of exchange" problem. Ideally, all system losses would converge 
at zero and the "bas is of exchange" could then be ignored. 
Rentals 
In the study area, most transfers involving the market are of three 
general types. These include sale of irrigation company stock, the rental 
of irrigation company stock, and the rental of water on a per acre foot 
basis . The last of these is by far the most common. 
Records indicate that rentals have occurred in some of the companies 
for more than 30 years. Undoubtedly "trades" were common practice long 
before any formal records were kept. 
Price 
A rental agreement can be initiated in a number of ways. In most 
instances, a dollar value per acre foot is agreed upon before an exchange 
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is culminated, although other arrangements are sometimes involved. 1 
Many farmers who rent water regularly have rather well defined sources 
of supply. Price and quantity are determined and the agreement is 
reported to the record clerk who records the changes in debits and credits 
in their respective accounts. In other instances, farmers having water to 
rent leave word with the record clerk who serves as a quasi broker and 
passes the information on to others who may wish to rent additional water. 
It is not uncommon for individuals having water for rent to engage the 
record clerk or some other person closely associated with the water 
market to rent their water for them. Accounts where water is held 
separate from the land or where land has been abandoned and the water 
rights retained, are often handled in thiS manner. Where irrigation 
companies hold water credits which are to be rented, care is taken not 
to enter the market before the rental price has been fairly well established 
by the transactions of individual farmers. This precludes criticism with 
regard to price setting and institutionalized prices . Thus, it appears that 
price is determined largely by the interaction of supply and demand conditions 
which prevail in the area at the time each rental agreement is initiated. 
Rental prices fluctuate between years and to some extent within 
1Late in the irrigation season, storage water is sometimes rented 
on the basis of an acre foot now for an acre foot in return in the following 
spring. This allows the person having unused water at the end of a season 
to forego an inevitable 15 or 20 percent reservoir shrink. This practice 
may also be used in connection with direct flow water, but the incentives 
are not nearly so obvious. 
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years. Average annual rental price per acre foot of water appears to 
be inversely correlated with the water available at the beginning of the 
irrigation season. Other factors which could be expected to have some 
effect on the rental price include product prices, other inputs, and 
technology. These variables wi.ll be considered in more detail in the 
next section. 
Within year variation in water rental prices may be attr ibuted to a 
multiplicity of factors. Foremost a mong these would be changes in the 
water supply not accounted for in the dividend. Natural disasters and 
abrupt changes in the prices of other inputs or products produced may 
also introduce within season price variation . 
Company policy on hold over water is another factor influencing 
within season price change. If a farmer is prudent and has unus ed water 
at the end of the s eason, it may be rented or stored, depending upon the 
company and the type of right. If he has the option to store it, the rental 
price should be higher than would be the case i.f he would lose the water if 
it were not used during the current season. Prior to 1938, any water that 
remained in the Sevier Bridge Reservoir at the end of the irrigation season 
became common water and was used to make up the storage rights for the 
next year. Because only two of the companies depended primarily upon 
storage and the others on direct flow, this policy tended to work in favor 
of the storage companies. This resulted in waste of water, because the 
holders of direct flow rights attempted to use up all of the ir water supplies 
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during the current season, rather than allow them to accrue to the storage 
companies. This was further accentuated by the fact that there were no 
intercompany transfers at that time. Since 1938, the four companies in 
the study area have allowed any water remaining in the Sevier Bric;lge 
Reservoir at the end of the irrigation season to belong to the company 
which had right to it during the current year. This water can be held 
over by that company to be used in the following season. The same 
privilege is a lso extended to the accounts of the individual shareholders 
within the companies. This policy has contributed greatly to the stability 
of the water supply because more water is carried over in years of 
abundance (4). 
With the advent of intercompany transfers, the rental price may be 
further affected. As was noted above, when system losses are less than 
the prevailing "basis of exchange", the importing company may realize 
a net surplus from the transaction. Suppose a given system has a 25 
percent system loss and the "basis of exchange" is 40 percent. There 
is a net gain of 15 percent which accrues to the importing system. Thus 
in aggregate, the water users in the second system receive an amount 
of water greater than the face amount of the transfer effected between the 
individuals involved. This "surplus" is first reflected in the company 
account and will eventually be reflected in the accounts of all the individuals 
holding stock in the company. Whether it becomes available to the farmer 
in the current season or during the following season is dependent upon the 
action taken by the company officials. They may declare a dividend in which 
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case it will be available during the current season, or they may hold 
it over, using it to make up individual water credits for the following 
season. In either case, it eventually accrues to all stockholders in 
the company in proportion to their respective holdings in the company. 
If this is generally recognized among the users in the importing system, 
it would have the affect of biasing the rental price upwards. It may 
appear that they are renting one acre foot, when in fact, they are renting 
one acre foot plus a proportionate share of the 15 percent. 
A similar bias may be present in the case of the exporting company 
having system losses somewhat less than the " basis of exchange." If 
this aggregate loss to the system is realized by the individual users on the 
system, they will demand a price which will compensate for it. Thus, 
ceretis paribus the presence of this type of influence would cause the 
rental price to be higher. 
In both instances, the affect of influences of this type on rental 
price would appear to be dependent upon two factors. The most obvious 
is the amplitude of the disparity between the "basis of exchange, " and 
the system losses. The second is dependent upon the reaction of 
individuals to group incentives. Where all of the companies alternate, 
at least to some extent, between the roles of exporter and importer, 
these net effects resulting from the "basis of exchange" may not 
persist long enough to be recognized and exploited by the companies 
to the point that the rental price reflects its influence. 
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Evidences of Flexibility 
Transfers 
The rental price, the number of transfers, and the percent of 
the water supply transferred under varying supply conditions should 
provide indicators of flexibility between users. These data are presented 
in Table 6. Intercompany transfers in which the water did not change 
ownership are not included in these data. The physical quantities trans-
ferred ranged from 5, 305 acre feet to 20, 993 acre feet per season. This 
amount does not vary greatly until the water available drops below 70, 000 
acre feet, after which it tends to diminish rather abruptly. As the total 
supply diminishes, it seems logical that less water would be available for 
rental. 
A somewhat different picture is presented where each year's transfers 
are expressed as a percentage of the water available for that year. Column 
5 in Table 6 includes the result of this calculation. As water supply 
diminishes, the percentage transferred tends to increase until supplies 
drop below the 70, 000 acre foot level. Below this point, the percentage 
of the water available that is transferred tends to drop off, as do the 
physical quantities. 
It is interesting to note that at 70, 000 acre feet each irrigated 
acre in the area has a theoretical supply of about 1. 4 acre feet per acre. 
Persons familar with the area estimate that this is a bare minimum of 
water to sustain production under present cropping patterns. If the area 
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Table 6. Changes in quantity transferred, rental price, and number of 
transfers at decreasing levels of water available, 1950-1964a 
Transfers as 
Water Rental a percentage No. of 
available Quantity price per of total trans-
Year for delivery transferred acre footb water available fersc 
(acre feet) (acre feet) 
1952 114, 371. 9 12,709.26 3.95 11.11 389 
1953 113, 521.0 17,913.20 2.70 15.78 468 
1958 94.260.5 17,868.90 4.98 18.96 629 
1950 92, 693.2 20,992.66 3.55 22. 65 486 
1962 74, 716.0 12, 466. 24 9.94 16. 68 462 
1959 72, 096.3 13,537.75 6. 96 18.78 561 
1955 71, 178. 5 15, 851. 55 6.44 22.23 541 
1951 71, 111. 2 18, 612.92 5. 66 26.17 604 
1954 70,266.8 20,409.77 6. 46 29.05 596 
1964 53,333.5 6, 976. 49 15.00 13.08 324 
1960 52, 686. 4 10, 531. 13 15.89 20.22 494 
1957 49, 564.9 6,683.35 15.15 13.48 375 
1956 48,170.0 8,283.66 10 . 40 17.20 406 
1963 44,945.5 9, 089. 67 16.95 20.22 483 
1961 42,086.5 5,305.29 19.94 12. 61 291 
aincludes only those transfers in which a change in ownership was apparently 
involved. 
bAdjusted to real terms by using the U. S. Wholesale Price Index, 1957-59 
base. 
cDoes not include those transfers to church and city property of less than 
2. 5 acre feet. 
Source: RecorCis of the four irri!ffiti.on companies in the Delta area. 
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is rather homogeneous with respect to crops grown and water use per 
acre, it seems logical to assume that adjustments downward from this 
point would come about only as substantially higher water prices 
because it would entail an abandonment of land. Although land costs 
are fixed and probably would not influence this decision, farm labor 
is quite immobil!i! and alternative employment in the area is scarce. 
The uncertainty connected with finding a market for his unused labor 
off the farm may cause the behavior of an individual farmer to appear 
irrational in the short-run. He may retain water even though the rental 
price is greater than the expected marginal return he envisions. 
The reduction in quantity transferred and number of transfers at 
lesser levels of supply is further explained by the reaction of water users 
to an increased price for water. Except in the case of Giffen's Paradox, 
a rational individual will always demand less of a commodity at higher 
prices than at lower prices. This is illustrated in Figure 3 using 
hypothetical data for illustrative purposes. Three acre feet will clear 
the market when the price is five dollars, but when this price is increased 
to fifteen dollars, only 1 acre foot will be taken. 
As the rental price becomes higher and higher, the value of 
marginal product of fewer and fewer users will be great enough to allow 
them to purchase additional water. By comparing Column 3 and Column 4 
in Table 6, it is readily apparent that quantity transferred varies 
inversely with the rental price. 
Price 
per 
acre 
foot 
15 
10 
D 
5 [-·----+---------
1 2 
Quantity of water demanded in acre feet 
Figure 3. Hypothetical demand curve for water. 
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The quantity of water involved in intercompany transfers should 
also be indicative of flexibility of control within the area. The gross 
amounts of intercompany transfers for the years 1951 through 1963 are 
shown in Table 7. It should be noted that these figures come from the 
company accounts and, as such, they include the "basis of exchange" 
and transfers which involved no change in ownership. For these reasons, 
they are not comparable to those data presented in Table d. The suppiy 
figure used here is the aggregate quantity diverted into the various systems 
during each year. 
Physical quantities transferred between companies reveal a rather 
incoherent pattern under increasing drought conditions. In periods of 
sustained drought, these percentages tend to increase signaling the 
importance of intercompany transfer under drought conditions. Four 
miniscule changes in the "basis of exchange" during this period of time 
probably serve to confound some of the implications which might be 
drawn from these data. The rather gradual increase in the percentage 
and quantity of water transferred since 1954 may be accounted for in 
part by adjustments toward a m!ltually satisfactory "basis of exchange" 
among the companies. 
VariabilitY in supply 
Flexibility is indicated by a reduction in the variability in supply 
between years. Data and statistical measures presented in Table 8 
tend to verify this observation. For the series of years 1950 through 1963, 
Table 7. The affect of changes in annual water deliveries upon the quantity of water involved in inter-
company transfers, 1951-1963 
Arrayed in terms of river diversion Arrayed by years 
Total annual Total annual 
river diversion Percentage river diversion Percentage 
at the head Quantity of total at the hea d Quantity of total 
Year of canals transferreda transferreda Year of canals transferred t r ansferred 
(acre feet) (acre feet) (acre feet) (acre feet) 
1953 150, 155 3,895.00 2.59 1951 126, 279 5, 416.57 4.29 
1958 147, 103 4, 519 . 39 3.07 1952 132, 739 4,241.08 3.20 
1952 132,739 4, 241.08 3.20 1953 150, 155 3, 895.00 2. 59 
1954 131, 055 1, 135.00 . 87 1954 131, 055 1,135.00 . 87 
1951 126, 279 5, 416.57 4.29 1955 115, 486 3,055. 93 2. 65 
1959 116,315 4,005.30 3.44 1956 83, 479 2, 165.22 2.59 
1955 115,486 3, 055.93 2.65 1957 79,890 3, 115. 05 3.90 
1962 102, 061 8, 621.73 8.45 1958 147, 103 4, 519. 39 3.07 
1960 85, 568 2,325.48 2.72 1959 116,3 15 4, 005 . 30 3.44 
1956 83,479 2, 165 . 22 2.59 1960 85, 568 2,325.48 2. 72 
1957 79, 890 3,115.05 3.90 1961 67,209 6, 013. 79 8.95 
1963 76, 446 9, 839.28 12.87 1962 102, 061 8, 621.73 8.45 
1961 67,209 6, 013.79 8.9 5 1963 76,446 9,839.28 12.87 
aFigures listed here are not comparable to those in Table 6 because these figures were taken from the 83 
company accounts, not individual farmer accounts. These figures also include transfers from one s ystem 
to another with no accompanying change in ownership. 
Table 8. River diversions with and without adjustment for intercompany transfers, 1950-1963a 
Company A Company B Company C Company D 
Year With Without With Without With Without With Without 
(acre feet) (acre feet) (acre feet) (acre feet) 
1950 20,327 19, 467 37, 930 38, 790 51, 830 51, 830 26, 239 26, 239 
1951 17,838 17,247 39,007 39,032 45, 598 45, 484 23, 83 6 24,516 
1952 22, 735 21,259 37, 384 40,017 48, 250 47, 239 24, 370 24,244 
1953 24,033 20, 138 42, 162 45, 750 58, 135 58, 442 25, 825 25,825 
1954 23, 660 22,525 38,930 40, 065 46, 180 46, 180 22, 285 22,285 
1955 19, 550 19, 363 34,219 33,796 40,243 39, 648 21 , 474 22, 679 
1956 12, 620 12, 371 22, 944 22,878 31, 410 31, 036 16, 505 17,194 
1957 16, 010 16, 605 23, 624 24,421 26, 048 24, 590 14, 208 14,274 
1958 25,710 25,544 42,293 42,591 51, 780 51,019 27, 320 27,949 
1959 18, 3 65 16, 849 32, 325 31, 916 43, 660 44, 299 21, 965 23, 251 
1960 13,242 13, 263 24,453 24, 068 29,448 29, 484 18, 425 18,753 
1961 11, 656 12,087 18, 125 18,021 23, 847 23, 875 13, 581 13, 226 
1962 19, 411 18, 752 32,058 32,210 32, 598 32,020 18, 097 19, 079 
1963 12, 751 12,391 24,011 21, 295 26, 056 27, 563 14, 988 15, 197 
Mean 18,422.4 17,704.3632,109.14 32,489.2) 39,648.79 39,479.21 20, 651.29 21,049.36 
Standard deviation 
from mean 4, 649. 61 4, 116.74 2, 543.2A 4 82UIJ 3, 559.23 3, 555.86 4, 671.97 4, 754.35 
aDifferences between diversions shown here for companies C and D and those shown in the river reports 
are due to losses in canal A. 
Source: Records of the four companies in the Delta area. 
ffi 
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two series of annual water divers ions are listed for each company. In 
each case, the column titled " with" indicates the quantity of water 
diverted into that company's system after adjustment for intercompany 
transfers. Similarly, the column titled "without" indicates the physical 
quantities that would have been diverted into each company' s s ystem with-
out intercompany transfer 0 
A comparison of the standard deviations for each company, with 
and without transfer, indicate that variability in supply is reduced in two 
companies, remains substantially the s ame in one, and increases only in 
company A. The unique position of company A may be partially explained 
by the fact that it is a consistent importer of water. Even in years of 
relatively abundant supply as in 1952, 1953, and 1958, this company 
continued to import water. This initiates speculation concerning the 
possibilities for expanding the irrigated acreage within that company's 
system to correspond with each season's water supply 0 
Rental price versus sale price 
In a world free of uncertainty in which impediments to transfer do 
not exist, the capitalized value of the expected annual rental price should 
approximate the selling price of a perpetual right to a similar quantity of 
water. A comparison of these two values is presented in Table 9. 
Several refinements were made in the data in order to facilitate a 
meaningful comparison. Because rental and sale price observations were 
Table 9. A comparison of the sale price per acre foot of water expected to be delivered and the 
capitalized value of the expected rental price per acre foot 
Company A Company B Company C Company D 
Capitalized Capitalized Capitalized Capitalized 
rental Sale rental Sale rental Sale rental Sale 
Year price price price price price price price price 
1955 93.80 65.24 -- -- -- -- 93.80 74.99 
1956 97.80 69.80 97.80 71.48 -- -- 97.80 82.77 
1957 130.00 63.57 130.00 58.05 130.00 81.00 130.00 85.82 
1958 192.20 76.64 192.20 99.60 -- -- 192.20 95.82 
1959 184.00 97.54 -- -- 184.00 119. 76 184.00 100.75 
1960 187.00 120.08 -- -- 187.00 116.82 187.00 105.94 
1961 215.00 120.12 -- -- 215.00 138.82 215 .00 109.96 
1962 238.80 122.26 -- -- 238.80 149.42 
1963 263. 60 159.91 263. 60 101.05 263.60 140.01 
1964 313. 60 164.45 313. 60 161. 82 
Mean 191. 58 105.96 199.44 98.4 203.07 124.30 157. 11 92.72 
t value 3.363* 2. 296a 3. 635** 3. 356* 
**Indicate significance at the o< .01level. 
*Indicate significance at the o< • 05 level. 
~ould be significant at the o< .051 level. 
-'I 
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taken over a considerable period of time, it seemed appropriate that they 
should be converted to real terms. The wholesale price index was used 
for this purpose. 
In order to account for the uncertainty found in the real world, a 
conversion to expected deliveries per share and expected rental prices 
was necessary. Several variations of two basic methods of obtaining 
expected values were tested to determine which method gave the best 
result. The methods tested were a simple moving average and an expectation: 
model which assigns various weights to each observation in accordance with 
its position in time with respect to the present. In the expectation model 
the heaviest weight is given to the most recently observed values. A 
"best model" was determined by observing the deviations of the expected 
values from the observed. The method in which the sum of the squared 
deviations from the observed data were least was considered the most 
appropriate. 
The results of these tests indicated that a five-year moving average 
was the most consistent indicator of the observed water deliveries, and 
rental prices were best approximated by incorporating a form of the 
expectation model in which the expectation coefficient ( P ) was assumed 
to be . 5. 
Information obtained from the four major loan institutions in the 
area indicated that since the early 1940' s, the major portion of loans 
made for the purchase of water stock have carried an interest rate of 
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about 5 percent per annum. For this reason, an interest rate of 5 percent 
was used in capitalizing the annual rental price. 
At the o( • 05 level, a t test of the difference between the means 
of the capitalized annual rental prices and the sale prices of a permanent 
right which is expected to deliver the same quantity of water reveals that 
all but one are significantly greater than zero, indicating that the means 
of sale and capitalized rental prices are significantly different. Because 
the means of the capitalized rental values are greater than the means of 
the sale prices, there is evidence that the market for annual use rights 
is somewhat more flexible than that for perpetual rights. It should be 
noted that this does not suggest that impediments to flexi.bi.li.ty do not 
exist in either case. It is simply implied that the degree of flexibility 
in the rental market is apparently greater than that which exists in the 
market for permanent rights. 
DEVELOPMENT OF VARIABLES AND PROCEDURE 
Hypothesis 
The hypothesis to be tested is that changes in the institutions 
which eliminate barriers to free transfer of a limited resource will 
result in an increase in the economic benefits derived from that 
resource. For the purposes of this study, the limited resource is the 
irrigation water supply for the Delta area in Utah. The institutions of 
con cern a re those community mores, irrigation company policies, and 
state water right laws which may affect (facilitate or impede) transfer 
of water between users. Because irrigation water is primarily an input 
factor used in the production of agricultural crops, evidence of benefit 
derived will be expressed in dollar terms as determined by an appropriate 
indicator of the value of marginal product produced by irrigation water. 
Changes in the Institutions to be Tested 
A rather exhaustive persual of local policy and customs pertinent 
to water transfer discloses one major change in policy which could be 
expected to have a significant influence on water transfer in the area. 
The change in question involves a policy gradually initiated between 
1946 and 1950 which allowed the water of any one irrigation company to 
be transferred into the systems of any of the other three companies in 
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the area. This increased the effective market area for water by 
about 400 percent and should have gone far to eliminate disparities 
in the marginal productivities which may have existed between the 
companies. 
Because this change in transfer policy was not instantaneous but 
required five years to become fully operable, it necessitated the com-
parison of rental price observations occurring in different time periods. 
Also, by introducing a time difference, factors other than the change 
in transfer policy could be expected to influence the rental price. Water 
supply, prices of products and other inputs, teclmology and chan.ges in 
the transfer conditions might all be expected to influence rental prices 
over time. Even under comparatively stable conditions, the significance 
attached to any differential which may occur between the two series of 
rental prices is necessarily dependent upon how well the influences of 
variables other than the change in transfer policy can be identified and 
quantified. 
Empirical Procedure 
Of primary concern in the statistical analysis was the determination 
of any significant difference between two series of irrigation water rental 
prices,~ each series having been associated with a different transfer policy. 
In order to accomplish this objective, it was necessary to test the signifi-
cance of variables which a priori might have influenced the rental price 
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occurring over the two time periods. 
Three statistical tools were used to provide this information. 
The first was a multiple regression analysis. The second involved a 
t test for significant differences between means of the same variable 
associated with each of two time periods. Commonly this technique 
is known as mean difference analysis. The third was a covariance 
analysis. In all cases, these techniques were uti.li.zed to determine the 
significance of various factors and to specify the degree of statistical 
confidence which cruld be attached to certain relationships found in the 
data. 
Multiple regression analysis 
Multiple regression is a teclmi.que which determines the effect of 
several independent variables upon a single dependent variable. Various 
tools have been devised to determine the absolute and relative importance 
of the various independent variables which a priori. could have a significant 
influence on the dependent variable. The general model used was as 
follows: 
Y = f (X1, x2, x 3) 
Where: 
Y = the dependent ( explai.ned)variabl~, 
x1, x2, x3: the relevant independent (explanatory) variables. 
Significant independent variables were determined by testing the 
significance of numerous sample statistics which provide estimates of the 
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population parameters and by ranking them. Included among these were 
the simple partial coefficients of correlation, the simple partial 
coefficients of determination, the regress ion coefficients, and the standard 
partial regress ion coefficients. 
At test was used to determine whether the simple partial corre lation 
coefficients were significantly different from zero (6). Sample partial 
coefficients of determination were calculated and ranked in the order of 
their apparent effect on the dependent variable. The significance of 
regression coefficients for the various independent variables was determined 
oy setting up the null hypothesis that/}= 0 and using at test. Finally, 
the standard partial regression coefficients were utilized to rank each 
independent variable in relation to the others. 
The results of these measures were used only as indicators of the 
significance of each variable. When contradictory results were obtained, a 
judgment had to be made on the basis of other criteria. Among these were 
the correlation coefficients for the model obtained from stepwise regression 
and the presence or absence of apparently significant interaction among the 
independent variables. If indicators consistently showed strong significance, 
the variable was considered significant. 
Va riables determined to be significant in the multiple regression 
analysis were included in the mean difference and covariance analyses. 
Mean difference analysis 
Mean difference analysis is a group comparison technique based on 
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students ' t test. At test of the difference between means is used for the 
purpose of determining, within the laws of probability, if the difference 
between calculated means may be attributed to differences in population 
mean or to random variation (15). 
In the mean difference analysis, t is calculated in the following 
manner: 
Where: 
(x1 - x2) - (M 1 - M 2) 
s x1 - x2 
M1 and M2 = the means of the respective populations and a re 
assumed to be equal, 
x1 and x2 = the respective sample means of the same variable 
occurring in the two separate groups, 
S 5q and x2 = the standard error of the difference between the 
two sample means and is analogous to the S x used 
in a simple t test. 
The null hypothesis relevant to this method of analysis is 
HO: M1 - M2 = 0, for each variable to be tested. A significant difference 
is indicated by a calculated t value which exceeds the tabular value at 
some previously determined probability level with degrees of freedom 
equal to the sum of the observation occurring in each group minus two. 
Covariance analysis 
Covariance analysis is essentially a combination of regression and 
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analysis of variance. The technique is designed to eliminate the effect 
of uncontrolled environmental conditions from treatment effects thus 
increasing the precision of the estimate of variation due to treatments (3). 
The dependent variable is regressed within each treatment on the 
independent variable or variables, the influence of which is to be 
eliminated from the treatment effects. Sample estimates of the regression 
coefficients and variables for each regression within treatments are tested 
to be certain that a covariance technique is applicable to the data. In 
general, the regression coefficients within treatments should not be 
significantly different from each other, and the variance about the regression 
should not be significantly different between treatments. Also if the 
correlation coefficient is less than . 3, the possibility of increasing 
precision with covariance is questionable. 
In this analysis, rental price was the dependent variable and different 
transfer policies were the treatments. Independent variables included were 
those found significant in the multiple regression analysis. 
Selection and Developm;g>,of Variables 
An a priori selection of variables thought to be important in 
accounting for the variation in water prices are: water supply available, 
alfalfa seed prices , livestock prices, other inputs, and technology (16). 
Each of these will be examined in detail within this section. 
Table 10 contains data for the dependent variable and all independent 
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Table 10. Data used i.;1. the statistical analysis 
~ 
Expected Expected 
Rental Water alfalfa livestock 
Allocative price available seed price price 
policy per per per 100 lb. per 100 lb. 
Year in effecta acre footb irrigated acre clean seed live weight 
(dollars) (acre feet) (dollars) (dollars) 
1934 1 3. 49 1. 298o 25.43 12.01 
1935 1 5. 71 . 7420 35.62 10.87 
1936 1 4.12 1.0203 31.78 12.39 
1937 1 2.52 1. 9478 37.05 13. 11 
1938 1 2.02 2.1333 46.16 13.95 
1939 1 2. 37 1. 8551 43.88 14.15 
1940 1 2.91 1. 8551 42.66 15.43 
1941 1 2.55 2. 1333 37.94 16. 53 
1950 2 3. 55 1. 81 68 40.93 24.12 
1951 2 5.66 1. 3938 48.96 26.19 
1952 2 3. 95 2.2417 50. 07 29.15 
1953 2 2.70 2. 2250 40.01 28.54 
1954 2 6. 46 1. 3772 31.43 23.29 
1955 2 6.44 1. 3951 36.47 20.38 
1956 2 10.40 . 9441 27.65 18.45 
1957 2 15.15 . 9715 29 . 76 16.72 
1958 2 4.98 1. 8475 28.23 17. 17 
1959 2 6. 96 1. 4131 25.00 20.22 
1960 2 15. 89 1. 0327 25.80 21.87 
1961 2 19.94 .8249 24. 94 21.01 
1962 2 9.94 1. 4644 30.99 20. 65 
1963 2 16.95 . 8809 38.09 20.06 
1964 2 15.00 1. 0454 32.00 20.46 
a 
A (2) A (1) indicates that only intracompany transfers were permitted. 
indicates that intercompany transfers were permitted. 
bRental prices have been adjusted to real terms by using the U. s. 
Wholesale Price Index, 1957-59 base. 
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variables which could be quantified and included in the statistical analysis. 
Price of water 
The dependent (explained) variable was the annual rental price of 
water. In order to obtain a measure of the effie iency implications 
associated with a change in transfer policy, it was necessary to find an 
indicator of the value of the marginal product of irrigation water both 
before and after this change occurred. Preferably it should be such that 
differences occurring could be tested statistically. The water rental 
market appeared to be sufficiently competitive to permit the rental price 
per acre foot to be used for this purpose. 
Since 1950, one rental price per acr e foot has prevailed in all of 
the companies during any given irrigation season. Prior to that time 
reliable price data were available for only one of the four companies. 
Because of this limitation, it was necessary to assume that the companies 
did not vary greatly and that the data obtained from this company was typical 
of conditions found in the other companies. This did not appear to be an 
especially heroic assumption because this company has the largest irrigated 
acreage and the rental market for water has been more active in it than 
in any of the other companies. Besides, water use and agriculture under 
this system are not dissimilar from those of the other companies in the 
area. If bias enters the analysis because of this extrapolation, it is 
most certainly on the side of conservatism. Ceteris paribus, the relatively 
large .irrigated acreage and active rental market within this company would 
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cause it to be affected by a lesser amount with the introduction of a free 
transfer policy than would the other companies where the market area 
was smaller and the rental market was not so completely developed. 
From these dat~, two series of rental prices were selected to 
approximate the value of the marginal product associated with each of 
the two institutional arrangements. These price observations were drawn 
from the years prior to and immediately following the transition to a 
relatively free transfer policy. 
The length of these two series was limited by a number of factors. 
Among these were the availability of reliable data, governmental activity 
in the water market, and the depressed economic conditions occurring 
prior to 1934. Although data were available before 1934, forced sales of 
water stock and generally chaotic financial adjustments occurring within 
the area and irrigation companies suggest that rental prices may not have 
been reliable indicators of value of marginal product during this period. 
The period 1934 through 1941 was relatively stable in this water 
market. The debts of the irrigation companies and drainage districts had 
been readjusted and placed on a sound basis of refinancing, the amount of 
irrigated land remained virtually constant and prices and general economic 
conditions were somewhat more stable (23) . 
1n 1942, the government began purchasing water stock at a price 
somewhat above the market price in order to obtain a water supply for 
the Topaz War Relocation Project that was to be constructed in the area. 
Approximately 20, 000 shares of stock, enough to irrigate 8, 000 to 10,000 
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acres, were purchased between 1942 and 1947 after which time it was 
resold to the farmers in the area . This action by the government had the 
affect of curtailing the rental market to such extent that few rentals 
occurred and virtually no rental price data were available for the years 
1942 through 1947. This, plus the typical wartime distortion of prices and 
market conditions prompted the exclusion of this period from the earlier 
series. Thus the rental prices occurring during the series of years from 
1934 through 1941 were used to approximate the value of the marginal 
product derived from water under the allocative policy which limited 
transfers to the extent of each individual company's canal system. 
Since 1950, there have been relatively few data problems. Con-
sequently, it was possible to include all of the rental prices occurring in the 
series of years from 1950 through 1964 in the later group. This group 
represents the rental price associated with a relatively free transfer 
policy in which the water of any company could be transferred into the system 
of any other company. 
Rental prices for the earlier period were obtained from data com-
piled for an earlier research effort by Dudley Crafts, a prominent lawyer 
and water authority who resides in the area. These rental prices were 
taken from records of the rental of rather large blocks of nonfarmer-
owned stock. During this period of time approximately 25 percent of the 
active shares of this company were held by persons and agencies other 
than farmers and were rented regularly. Because there was no apparent 
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reason for nonfarm owners of water s tock to react differently than farm 
owners , one could expect the r ental price to be a very good approximation 
of the value of the marginal product derived from the last unit of water used. 
The prevailing conditions which existed in the water market area 
and the suitability of the rental price in approximating the return from the 
use of water as described in the Wartime Water Facilities Plan as 
follows: 
This condition of buyers and sellers dealing to effect 
the renting of approximately a ll of the available stock 
year after year has presented a fairly open market where 
supply and demand have been prime factors in determining 
the prices paid. 
Special significance attaches to the prices paid by 
farmers for the r ental of water stock. In general these 
rentals seem to indicate the amount that farmers are 
willing to pay for the us e of the water and this price is 
no doubt based largely on the estimated value of the water 
to the farmer in terms of crop production. (23, p. 24) 
Rental prices for the later period were obtai ned from a rental 
reeord of the water r epresented by 385 shares of company A stock. This 
estimate of the market rental price is more accurate than the size of the 
sample would indicate because it is customary to wait until the market 
price is well established before offering company water for rent. 
Because these two series of price data covered a rather long 
period of time in which there were sharp changes in the aggregate price 
level, it was nee essary to deflate them so that they would be comparable 
in terms of purchasing power. The wholesale price index for all 
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commodities was used for this purpose (21). 
Water available 
It seems logical to assume that the rental price of water will be 
greatly affected by changes in the quantity of water available. Ceteris 
paribus, a reduction in the supply of water will cause the market price 
to increase. When water is in short supply, it will be used only in more 
valuable uses, thus the value of the marginal product should rise. For 
this reason a careful evaluation of the water supply was deemed a pre-
requisite to subsequent comparison of rental prices since this variable 
might explain much of the variation in the marginal value products of 
water in the two periods. If so, one would be less confident about drawing 
conclusions concerning the effect of changes in transfer regulations . 
Despite rather extensive storage facilities, the irrigation water 
supply for the Delta area remains quite volatile. As a result, any attempt 
to estimate the expected delivery for any year or period of years in the 
future is greatly complicated. However, when working with the rental 
price, this area of uncertainty is largely circumvented. After April 1 of 
any given season, the water credits available have been determined, making 
it possible to plan with a minimum of uncertainty. In most rental trans-
actions, the farmer bargains for a specified quantity of water and not some 
expected quantity. For this reason the aggregate water credit available to 
the farmers at their headgates was deemed the most appropriate supply 
variable to include in this analysis. 
87 
Because the price data for the early period were representative 
of just one company, and that of the later period were for the aggregate of 
companies, the supply figure or water available for any given season had 
to be reduced by a common denominator in order to facilitate any meaning-
ful comparison. Due to the nature of water use in this area, the -most 
appropriate common denominator for water available appeared to be the 
number of irrigable acres to which this supply could be applied. Appropriate 
acreage figures were obtained from the Millard County Assessor's Office. 
Thus the variable representing supply was reduced to water available per 
irrigated acre as shown in column 4 of Table 10. 
Expected price of products 
The price which a farmer will pay for a unit of water is dependent 
in part upon the price he expects to receive from his crops. A farmer should 
be willing to apply an input factor up to that point where the marginal factor 
cost equals the value of the marginal product. The value of the marginal 
product is a function of the product price. As the expected product price 
rises a farmer will find it profitable to employ more of the factor of 
production. Therefore high product prices are consistent with greater 
quantities of factors employed. The inverse is also true. A decrease 
in product prices will cause the value of the marginal product to fall, 
thus the farmer will be able to employ the same quantity as formerly 
only at a lower factor price . Therefore low product prices are consistent 
with lesser quantities of the factor employed. 
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Because alfalfa seed and livestock products are the major 
sources of income for the area (20), the expected price of alfalfa seed 
and a measure of the expected price for livestock were included as 
variables in this analysis as indicators of the effect of product prices 
upon the rental price of water. 
Alfalfa seed prices. In the census years 1939, 1944, 1949, 1954, 
and 1959, the alfalfa seed crop accounted for an average of 61 percent of 
the value of all field crops sold in Millard County (22). The Delta area 
comprises about 75 percent of the irrigated acreage in Millard County and 
specialization in alfalfa seed production i.s even more intense there than 
in the remainder of the county. Irrigation company officials estimate that 
80 to 90 percent of the irrigated acreage in the area is planted to alfalfa. 
This can be attributed to the scarcity of water and to the predominance of 
heavy clay soils which tend to favor the alfalfa crop. 
Because alfalfa seed produced in the Delta area represents about 
60 percent of the total production of the state, prices for the state were 
cons idered a good approximation of this variable for the study a rea. The 
price of alfalfa seed i.s set nationwide and the supply produced by the 
state of Utah is a very small part of the total national supply. Therefore, 
what happens in the area of alfalfa seed production has little to do with 
the state or national price. Basic data used in calculating the expected 
alfalfa seed prices used in the analysis were obtained from data released 
by the Statistical Reporting Service. 
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Livestock prices. In census years since 1939, sale of live-
stock and livestock products have accounted for an average of 59 percent 
of the value of all farm products sold in Millard County. In the same 
years, sale of cattle and calves accounted for an average of 59 percent 
of the value of livestock and livestock products sold (22). Because of the 
relative importance of cattle and calves in the livestock group, the expected 
price variable for this analysis was based on a weighted average of cattle 
and calf prices. 2 
On a priori grounds, the livestock price may not appear to have 
been an appropriate variable because livestock are a rather indirect pro-
duct of irrigation water. However, census data for Millard County indicate 
that a rather large amount of alfalfa hay is grown, w'ith only a small 
percentage being marketed directly. This indicates that a substantial 
portion of the hay was marketed through livestock. If the expected price 
of livestock were relatively high, more water could be demanded for the 
production of hay. 
The expected livestock price thus may have an affect on the rental 
price of water. Basic price data on cattle and calves were obtained from 
livestock price data recently made available by the Statistical Reporting 
Service . 
2Livestock price was determined by calculating a weighted average 
of cattle and calf prices. Weights were determined by calculating the 
percentage each of these contributed to the total value of cattle and calves 
sold. 
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Refinements of both alfalfa seed and livestock price data included 
an adjustment to a common price index and the determination of an expected 
price for each year. As in the case of the rental price variable, the whole-
sale price index was used to convert the prices to real terms. 
In this analysis, expected prices were deemed more appropriate than 
observed prices for explaining the actions of farm operators. During any 
given season, the decisions a farmer makes are based on what he expects 
will happen. It seems reasonable to assume that what a farmer expects in 
the future is some function of phenomena he has observed in the past. In the 
static model. or in the case of an administered price which is fixed, future 
price expectations would be exactly equal to the most recently observed past 
price . Under these conditions the expected price is a function of the last 
previous price giving 100 percent of the weight to that value. Variables 
other than previous prices could be evaluated but they would not contribute 
to the analysis under these circumstances. 
Most commodity prices, including those of alfalfa seed and live-
stock, are somewhat volatile. Under these circumstances it seems reason-
able to assume that future price expectations will include a considerable 
number of past observations of the same variable. P robably the leas t 
complicated method of calculating an expected price using one variable is a 
simple average of previous prices. This gives equal weight to each 
observation included in the average. In the absence of a trend or 
oscillations which are of a uniform or predictable nature this would appear 
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to be the most appropriate tool. However, an expectation model which 
utilizes a weighted average of past observed prices, giving the highest 
weights to the most recent observations, might generate more realistic 
price expectations. 
A widely used model of this type was used in calculating the 
expected prices to be used in this analysis. It utilizes only one variable, 
past prices, and attaches decreas ing we ights to each price observation as 
determined by its relative position in time with respect to the present. 
This particular function used in this study is as follows : 
p e= fJ Pt -. (1 - /3 ) /1 Pt - 1 + (1 - 13 )2 /1 Pt - 2 ,. 
••• + (1 - (3 )n- 1 /3 Pt - (n - 1) 
Where: 
P: the observed price for alfalfa seed, 
P e= the expected value of P , 
Pt, Pt _ 1 , . • . Pt -(n _ 1) : the observed values of P for n 
time periods beginning with Pt _ ¢1- 1: 
and extending forward to the current 
period t, 
(1 -/3), (1 -/3 )2 , ..• (1 -/.l )n- 1 " the weights to be applied 
to the P's observed in the 
periods t back to t - (n- 1). 
·It was assumed that /i = . 5. A coefficient of this size weights the 
most recently observed price just equal to the proportion of the total weight 
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assigned to all other observations. Under this assumption, 99.9 
percent of the total weight attached to the expected price is accounted 
for in ten years or from t - 9 through t time periods. 
These expected prices for alfalfa seed and livestock are listed in 
Table 10 together with water available per irrigated acre and the annual 
rental price per acre foot (real terms). 
Other inputs 
The quantities of other inputs used in conjunction with water could 
also be expected to have some effect upon the rental price of water. If 
quantities of other factors used jointly with water are increased, the marginal 
physical product of water is driven up as is the value of the marginal product. 
Foremost among these other inputs is land. 
Land. Although the amount of water applied per acre is variable, 
in an arid region where some irrigation water is absolutely essential for 
production, there is some minimum level of supply per acre where water 
and land may become technical complements. Given these conditions, it 
seems logical to assume that substantial changes in the acreage to be 
irrigated without a corresponding change in the water supply would have a 
considerable affect on the rental price of water. Given a fixed water supply, 
an expansion in irrigated acreage should drive up the value of the marginal 
prod! ct of water. 
Data found in the Water Facilities Plan (23) indicates that between 
1934 and 1941 the irrigated acreage in the study area was relatively 
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constant at 39, 700 acres. These data were taken from the Millard 
County Assessor's records. In all of Millard County, land in farms 
irrigated was 72, 897 in 1939 and 77, 140 in 1944 (22). 
In the later period, 1950 through 19 64, the number of acres 
irrigated in the study area also appears to have been quite constant. 
Data from the Soil Conservation Service indicated an irrigated acreage of 
51, 306.9 in 1959. Assessment roles list 51, 020.0 acres as of the end of 
1964. For all of Millard County, land in farms irrigated in census years 
was 77, 740 acres in 1949, 81, 919 acres in 1954, and 75, 793 in 1959 (22). 
The figures for Millard County would necessarily show more 
fluctuation than the study area because Millard County data includes one 
rather large high water irrigation company. For the most part this 
company has rights of low priority and very little water is available 
for it until the rights of the four companies in the study area are filled. 
Because the irrigated acreage tended to be constant within each 
time period, it was possible to exclude variation in irrigated acreage as a 
variable affecting rental price. 
Technology 
New technology could be expected to affect the price of water. 
The introduction of a technological advance, such as hybrid corn, may 
generate a new production function such that a greater output of product 
is obtained with the same expenditure of resources. This would have the 
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affect of shifting the value of the marginal product curve to the right, 
thus increasing the demand for water. Under these circumstances, 
either more water will enter the market or a higher price will be paid 
for the former quantity depending whether or not the supply to the area 
is fixed. 
Since 1940, several supposed improvements in technology have 
been introduced which may have had some affect on the rental price of 
water. Among these are commercial fertilizers, insecticides, mechani-
zation, and new crop varieties. For the most part, technological develop-
ment is output increasing and should be reflected in increased crop yields 
per acre. Assuming that the study area is not substantially different from 
the state and that alfalfa seed yields can be used as an indicator of the 
effect of new technology, there is little evidence that any of these were 
effectual either singly or collectively. The average yield of clean alfalfa 
seed per acre in the state was 155.38 pounds for 21 years prior to 1940, 
and 153.53 pounds for the last 25 years. 
A closer examination of certain unique features of the study area 
may help to explain why possible technological improvements were rather 
ineffectual. Foremost among these is the fact that soil and water limitations 
have resulted in a virtual one crop economy, that being alfalfa. 
New varieties . Although several new varieties of alfalfa have 
been developed, it is extremely doubtful that any variety was introduced 
because of its higher seed yields. Increased tonnage should be a positive 
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factor; however, the impact would be quite slow in becoming apparent 
because a lfalfa stands are not changed readily. The usual duration of 
a stand is from 5 to as much as 20 years. 
Fertilizer. Soil studies conducted in the area in 1919 indicated 
that no commercial fertilizer and very little manure were used in the area 
at that time (17). A later study indicates that the soils of the area contain 
ample quantities of all fertilizer elements but nitrogen (12). The first 
record of fertilizer use in the census (22) came in 1954 when 1, 331 tons 
were used on 9, 077 acres in a ll of Millard County. By 1959, this amount 
had decreased to 888 tons used on 5, 193 acres. If it is assumed that a ll 
of the fertilizer were us ed on irrigated lands, only 11.1 percent of the 
irrigated acreage in Millard County received some fertilizer in 1954, and 
6. 8 percent in 1959. During these same years the water supply for the 
study area was virtually constant with 70, 266.8 ac re feet available in 
1954 and 72, 09 6 available in 1959. Judging from this data it would 
appear that fertilizer application is independent of water supply and the 
quantity used has decreased between two years when other inputs (land 
and water) remained quite constant. In addition, 80 to 90 percent of the 
area is planted to alfalfa, a nitrogen fixing crop, which has little need for 
fertilizer on the relatively new soils found in the Delta area. Under these 
circumstances it is possible that farmers realize little or no response 
from the use of fertil izer except on crops other than alfalfa. Because 
crops other than alfalfa make up such a small portion of the total of crops 
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produced, there is little reason to believe that fertilizer has a sub-
stantial affect on the value of the marginal product of water and thus 
on water rental prices. 
Mechanization. Although new mechanical tools have been 
introduced, there is no evidence available which would indicate that they 
have affected yields. The total labor input per acre may even be less 
because of the more extensive methods usually associated with large 
scale operations. Also, it seems highly improbable that machinery serves 
in any was as a substitute for water. Therefore, it was concluded that the 
effect of increased mechanization on the rental price of water was negligible. 
Insecticides. The introduction of insecticides should have had a 
positive affect on alfalfa seed yields. However, some farmers in the area 
indicate that careless use of chemicals may have reduced the number of 
pollinators to the extent that seed yields were decreased. It is not likely 
that this is a trend which will persist. If insecticides have resulted in 
increased alfalfa seed yields, these increases have been more than 
absorbed by other negative factors. On this basis it was concluded that 
the introduction of insecticides did not affect the value of the marginal 
product of water during the period of time included in this analysis . 
ANALYSIS AND RESULT 
This s ection includes a listing of the analysis and results obtained 
from the multiple regression, mean difference, and covariance analyses. 
Multiple Regression 
In the regression model let: 
Y = average annual rental price per acre foot (dollars), 
Xp water available annually per irrigated acre (acre feet), 
x2 " expected price of alfalfa seed per hundred weight (dollars), 
x3 = expected price of livestock per hundred weight (dollars). 
Scatter diagrams of the relationship between the dependent variable 
(Y) and each independent variable (X1, x2, x 3) are presented in Figures 4 
through 6. 
Results of the regression equation were as follows: 
X= 16.052622- 7.8872741Xl- .13344741X2 - .40234719X3 
(. 053165356) (. 75555729) 
(148.3536) (.17662) 
(. 12533946) 
(3. 21006) 
Values in parentheses under the regression coefficient are the 
standard errors (Sb) and calculated t values for each coefficient, Twenty-
three sets of annual observations for Y, X1, X2, a nd x3 were included in 
the analysis . Using three independent variables and one dependent variable 
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left 19 degrees of freedom (n - 4). With 19 degrees of freedom, 
calculated values of t greater than 2. 093 at the 5 percent level and 
greater than 2. 861 at the 1 percent level differ significantly from zero. 
Determination of significant variables 
Simple partial correlation coefficients, simple partial coefficients 
of determination, standard partial regression coefficients as well as the 
partial regression coefficients were obtained from the multiple regression 
analysis. Simple partial correlation coefficients between water rental 
price and each independent variable as well as the partial regression 
coefficients were subjected to at test to see if they differed significantly 
from zero. Simple partial coefficients of determination were ranked in 
the order of their apparent influence on the water rental price variable. 
Also, the standard partial regression coefficients for each independent 
variable were ranked, each in relation to the others . 
The results of these tests for significance and rank of importance 
for each independent variable are presented in Table 11. Independent 
variables chosen for further analysis were determined by evaluating the 
results shown in this table. 
Water available per irrigated acre. A test of the partial 
regression coefficient for this variable was highly significant. The standard 
partial regression coefficient was ranked number one and was nearly twice 
as great as that of either of the other variables. The simple partial 
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Table 11 . Measures of significa nce and r ank for each independent 
variable 
Partial 
Independent regression 
variable coefficient 
Water available 
per irrigated 
acre 
xl 
Expected price 
of alfalfa 
seed/ cwt. 
- 7.887274la 
Standar d 
partial 
r egr es sion 
coefficient 
-. 7030 (l)b 
x2 - .13344741 - . 1881 (3) 
Expected price 
of livestock 
per cwt. 
x3 . 40234719 • 3766 (2) 
Coefficient Coefficient 
of of 
correlation determination 
-.7374482la 54.383% (l)b 
- .51958773 26.997% (2) 
. 18203542 3. 314% (3) 
aCalculated t values differed significantly from zero at both the o< • 05 
and the <><::: • 01 probability levels. 
bThe number in parentheses is the rank or order number. 
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coefficient of correlation was significantly different from zero at the 
o< • 01 level. The simple partial coefficient of determination also ranked 
first in importance at 54.383 percent. 
In comparison, this variable was rated first in importance by 
all four criteria. On this basis, it was concluded that water available 
per irrigated acre was a significant variable and that it should be included 
in any subsequent analyses. 
Expected price of alfalfa seed. The partial regression coefficient 
for this variable was not significantly different from zero even at o< • 50 
level. The standard partial regression coefficient was of least importance. 
The simple partial coefficient of correlation was not significantly different 
from zero at the . 05 level; however, the simple partial coefficient of 
determination was second in importance at 26.997 percent. 
Thus, three of the four criteria indicated that this variable was 
of very little importance in the model. The fourth indicated that 26. 997 
percent of the variability in water rental price was explained by this 
variable when other independent variables were held constant at their 
means. 
This apparent inconsistency may be explained by the presence of 
a significant interaction between this variable and the variable representing 
water available . The sign of this interaction is positive indicating that 
increases in the water available per acre accompany increases in expected 
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alfalfa seed prices or vice versa. Because there appears to have been 
no logical basis for this relationship, it must have been spurious correlation 
and can be attributed only to chance. 
Since three of the four criteria indicated that this variable was 
of little importance in the model, it was concluded that it could be 
eliminated from subsequent statistical analyses. 
Expected price of livestock. At test of the partial regression 
coefficient for this variable was highly significant. The standard partial 
regression coefficient was second in importance, about one-half the 
magnitude of the variable of highest rank. The simple partial regression 
coefficient was nonsignificant at the o< .05 level and the simple partial 
coefficient of determination was the least of any variable at 3. 314 percent. 
In the previous section it was noted that this variable was included 
on rather questionable a priori. grounds because of its indirect relationship 
with irrigation water. Of the four criteria used to determine significance, 
only one ranked this variable as significant. Under these circumstances, 
it was considered a bit presumptuous to include the variable in subsequent 
analyses unless all criteria indicated that it was significant. For these 
reasons the expected price of livestock was excluded from further analyses. 
Additional test of the two variables not significant 
After i.t was determined that water available per irrigated acre 
was the only independent variable significantly affecting the rental price 
variable, a new regression model was formulated using only water 
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available per irrigated acre as the independent variable. Expected prices 
of alfalfa seed and livestock were not included. This facilitated a com-
parison of the multiple coefficient of determination (R2) for the two 
models, one including all independent variables, the other including only 
significant variables. If the multiple coefficient of determination was not 
reduced significantly by removal of these variables, it would indicate that 
little explanatory power would be lost by leaving them out of the analysis. 
The exclusion of these two independent variables resulted in an 11 percent 
decrease in the multiple coefficient of determination. This indicated that 
the explanatory value of the model was not greatly reduced by the removal 
of nonsignificant variables. 
In observing the scatter diagram of rental price per acre foot 
and water available per irrigated acre as presented in Figure 4, there 
was some indication that a curvilinear model would give a better fit of 
the data. This did not seem to be true with the price of livestock and 
price of alfalfa seed variables. Rental price and water supply variables 
were therefore converted to logarithms and the computations made again. 
In this analysis the coefficient of determination (R2) for the model was 
increased by 5. 24 percent. Although the fit was slightly better, it seems 
doubtful that it was enough better to justify complicating the interpretation 
of the result. If a curvilinear model were used, it would be very difficult 
to test the assumptions pertinent to the covariance technique which was to be 
used later in the analysis. Thus, the linear model was retained. 
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Mean Difference Analysis 
The rental price variable and the water available variable 
were subjected to a mean difference analysis. The purpose of this test 
was to determine if mean difference for these variables differed 
significantly from zero under the two a llocative arrangements considered 
in this study. The rental price of water per acre foot and water available 
per irrigated acre were tested in this manner. 
Interpretation of the results of 
the mean difference analysis 
The mean annual rental price for these years when intercompany 
transfers were not permitted was $3.21 per acre foot. During the later 
period under more liberal transfer arrangements the mean annual rental 
price was $9. 60 per acre foot. The means of water available were found 
to be 1. 61 and 1. 39 acre feet respectively for the same time periods. 
Mean differences for rental price and water available were found to be $6. 39 
and . 23 acre feet respectively. 
Calculated values of t used for testing the significance of the 
mean differences associated with each of these variables are shown in 
Table 12. 
The mean difference of water supply did not differ significantly 
from zero even at the o< . 20 level. However, the mean difference for 
rental price was highly significant. 
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Table 12. "t" values for mean difference analysis of water available 
per irrigated acre, and rental price of water 
Variable tested t value 
Water available 1. 084287a 
Rental price 4.224* 
aNot significant at oC. .05 level. 
*Significant at ot: . 01 level. 
When the mean values of the water supply are not significantly 
different between time periods, it is an indication that the average affect 
upon the rental price variable was essentially the same in both time 
periods. Assuming that thi.s variable explains a major part of the variability 
in rental price, the significant difference occurring between the means of 
the rental price variable can then be attributed to the change in transfer 
policy. 3 
Covariance Analysis 
The ultimate purpose of the covariance analysis is to obtain mean 
3within each of the two separate groups of rental prices for the 
years 1934-1941 and 1950-1964, a linear regression of water supply on 
rental price indicated that 90 percent and 75 percent of the variability in 
rental price was accounted by changes in the water supply. Thus it 
would appear that variables other than those evaluated here have little 
affect on the rental price. 
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values for the dependent variable which have been adjusted for the variation 
attributed to the independent variable. There were two treatments or 
groups in the analysis, each corresponding to a period of time in which a 
particular transfer policy was in effect. Water rental prices per acre foot 
were regressed within each treatment against water available per irrigated 
acre. Thus two separate regression lines were fitted to the data, each 
one reflecting the relationship between the water rental price per acre 
foot and water available per irrigated acre within each treatment. 
Before proceeding further, measures obtained from these regressions 
were utilized to test certain assumptions pertinent to the covariance 
analysis. In covariance analysis, it is assumed that all samples within 
treatments are drawn from normal populations with common variances, and 
that the slopes of the regressions are the same or not significantly different 
between treatments. Estimates of the variances about the regression lines 
and the respective regression coefficients were subjected to an F test to 
establish whether or not they differed significantly. Should the result of 
these tests of the sample statistics fail to coincide with the assumptions 
pertinent to covariance, it would necessitate the use of an approximate 
test. 
Techniques used in the approximate test vary depending upon which 
assumptions are violated. When the residual variances between treatments 
are found to differ significantly, the usual tests are employed, however, 
the number of degrees of freedom used in testing is ordinarily reduced. 
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Should both assumptions be violated, the approximate test becomes 
somewhat more complicated. Instead of adjusting the treatment regressions 
along a common regression,all treatment regressions are adjusted along 
their respective slopes or planes to a predetermined value for the 
independent variable. The significance of differences due to treatment 
for predicted values of the dependent variable can then be tested at that 
level of the independent variable. In this test the number of degrees of 
freedom is again reduced because it is an approximation. 
Preliminary tests of the regression coefficients and residual 
variances indicated that both are significantly different between treatments. 
Although the technique is not usually invalidated by failure to meet the 
assumptions, results obtained from any subsequent analysis would be 
suspect and should be regarded as approximate rather than exact (3, p. 83). 
In order to minimize the effect of this discrepency on subsequent 
measures , a conservative approximate test was used. Instead of adjusting 
treatment regressions along a common regression, they were adjusted in 
terms of their respective slopes and compared at a given level of water 
available. Degrees of freedom used in testing the significance of 
differences between predicted rental prices at given levels of water available 
were reduced from 21 to 7. 
Result of the covariance analysis 
When water available was assumed to be equal to the 23 year average 
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of water available per irrigated acre, at test of the difference in 
predicted rental prices between treatments was highly significant. At 
probability level . 01 with seven degrees of freedom tabular t is 3. 499. 
The calculated t value was 136.919. Results of this magnitude dispell any 
doubt that the rental prices do not vary with transfer policy. 
At the assumed level of water available, predicted rental prices 
for the treatments we re $8. 75 and $3.54 per acre foot. This indicated 
that a price differential of $5. 21 could be attributed to variations in the 
transfer arr angements. 
Determination of allocative efficiency 
In both the mean difference and covariance analyses, it was 
determined that a significant differential existed between the rental price 
occurring under different transfer policies. Special significance attaches 
to this differential when it is recalled that the market price of a commodity 
is a good approximation of the value of the marginal product derived from 
its use. An examination of this differential should provide information 
concerning the relative efficiency of the two allocative policies in question . 
A dollar measure of the annual gain or loss associated with alternativ€ 
allocative policies was obtained by multiplying the differential in the per 
acre foot rental prices by the average number of acre feet available at the 
farm. A ce rtain amount of error may enter this calculation because of an 
inability to predict futur e water deliveries. However, the mean quantity 
- -------------------------
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available at the farm should be a reasonable approximation where a 
rather large number of years are involved, if it can be assumed that 
variations in precipitation and other weather conditions which may affect 
supply are completely random in occurrence over time. 
The product of the differential in rental price and average water 
available per season should be considered as an annual flow for as long 
as a particular allocative policy i.s in affect. The present value of this 
flow over any future period of time can be calculated by incorporating the 
following capitalization equation. 
PV: ~ (1 - ( + i.tn) 
l 
Where: 
PV: the present value of the annual flow of gain or loss associated 
with a given allocati.ve policy over some future period of time, 
da: the annual differential in rental prices multiplied by the average 
quantity of water available at the farm, 
i : the interest rate, 
n ~ the number of years into the future over which the present 
value of the flow is being estimated. 
It should be noted that if n is allowed to go to infinity, the equation 
shown above simplifies to: 
da 
PV:-
i 
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Results of this calculation using both measures of the differentia l 
in rental prices and at various interest rates are shown in Table 13. 
The capitalized value of the differential in rental prices is a 
measure of the increase in value of the limited water resource. Because 
this increase in value was associated with the initiation of a new allocative 
policy, i.t can be said that this new policy was more efficient than the 
former arrangement. 
Table 13. Pres ent value (dollars ) of the gain or loss associated wi.th a lternative allocative policies for 
the aver age quantity of water available for irrigation in the Delta area, Utah 
Expected 
Average du ration 
Source annual of the 
of the value policy Interest rate 
measure (dollars )a i.n years 4 6 8 10 12 
10 3, 679, 886 3, 339, 164 3, 044,265 2, 787,930 2, 563, 353 
Mean 20 6, 165, 659 5,203,834 4, 454, 337 3, 862, 724 3, 388, 617 
difference 453, 690 30 7, 845, 222 6, 245,055 5, 107, 652 4, 276, 944 3, 654, 480 
analysis 40 8, 979, 903 6, 826, 233 5, 410, 263 4, 436, 643 3, 740, 227 
(6. 39) 50 9, 746, 187 7' 151, 075 5, 550, 454 4, 498,345 3, 767, 449 
= 11,342,272 7, 561, 514 5, 671, 13 6 4, 53 6, 908 3, 780, 757 
10 3,000,345 2,722, 542 2,482,101 2, 273, 101 2, 089, 995 
20 5, 027, 086 4,242,876 3, 631, 783 3,149,419 2, 762, 863 
Covariance 30 6,396,496 5, 091, 821 4, 164, 455 3, 437, 148 2, 979, 630 
analysisb 369,910 40 7, 321, 643 5, 565, 676 4, 411, 185 3, 617, 357 3,049,544 
(5.21) 50 7, 946, 422 5,830,532 4, 525, 487 3, 667, 664 3,071, 738 
0.0 9, 247, 768 6, 165, 178 4, 623, 884 3, 699 , 107 3,082, 589 
a Average water available at the farm per season (70, 000 . 14) multiplied by the differential i.n rental 
price of water per acre foot. 
bEstimate derived from the approximate test. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Statement of the Problem 
Water is among the most vital of a ll resources. Increased demand 
has resulted in a high degree of competition to secure the rights to water 
both among and within uses. 
In order to attain the maximum social productivity, allocation 
should be such that the value of the marginal social product of water is 
equal in all uses. Because of the dynam ic nature of the uses for water, 
the maximum productivity can be achieved only if the resource can be 
freely moved from places and uses of lower mar ginal value to higher 
ones. 
This study was concerned with value of rights to water, transfer 
of rights in the water market, and restrictive influences as they affect the 
optimum a llocation of irrigation water. 
Primary Objective and Procedure 
The primary objective of this study was to determine the relative 
efficiency of different allocative schemes for irrigation water. Alternatives 
considered in this analysis included a comparison of two market situations, 
one in which only intracompany transfers were permitted, and a second 
in which intercompany transfers were allowed. 
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Efficiency of allocation was determined by comparing indicators 
of the value of the marginal product associated with the two allocative 
arrangements. A rather long history of water market activity in the 
study area made it possible to use the annual rental price of water as the 
indicator of the value of the marginal product of water. Formal records 
indicated that very active markets have been in existence for more than 
30 years. Ceteris paribus, the higher the value of the marginal product 
(rental price) the greater the efficiency of allocation. 
Because this comparison of value of the marginal products (rental 
prices) was made over a considerable period of time, other variables 
besides the change in transfer policy which could be expected to influence 
the rental price of water were also considered. Included in this group of 
variables were water available, product prices, other inputs, and 
technology . Each of these variables was evaluated to determine its 
relative importance and what influence, if a.11y, it had on the rental price 
of water. Those found significant were included in subsequent statistical 
comparisons of rental prices. 
Results 
The water available per irrigated acre was determined to be a. 
significant explanatory variable. It was then possible to account for this 
s ignificant relationship in establishing the "true" effect of the two transfer 
policies on rental prices. 
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Mean difference analysis 
The average rental price under the policy which permitted 
intercompany transfer of water was $9. 60 per acre foot. The average 
rental price under the more restrictive policy in which only intracompany 
transfers were permitted was $3 . 21 per acre foot. A mean difference 
of $6. 39 was significantly different from zero at the c< . 01 level, indicating 
that the average rental price was significantly higher under the free transfer 
policy. 
The means of water available per irrigated acre during the same 
periods of time were 1. 39 and 1. 62 acre feet respectively. The mean 
difference of . 23 acre feet was not significantly different between the 
different allocative arrangements . This indicated that any difference in 
the means of this variable between periods could be attributed only to 
chance. 
Covariance approximation 
Predicted values of the rental price at 1. 47 acre feet per irrigated 
acre were $8. 75 and $3. 54 per acre foot respectively. The higher rental 
value was again associated with that policy which permitted intercompany 
transfers. A difference of $5.21 between predicted rental values at the 
average level of water available was significantly different from zero at 
the o< . 01 level. 
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Conclusions 
Statistically significant differences between the mean values 
and also the predicted values of the rental price under different a llocative 
policies provides strong evidence that transfer policies influence the 
efficiency of allocation. In both tests the indicator of the value of the 
marginal product of water was higher under the transfer policy which was 
most flexible and permitted intercompany transfers. Using the most con-
servative estimate of difference in water value, it was determined that the 
value of the water was increased by 147 percent by permitting greater 
flexibility between users. It was concluded that an allocative policy 
which permits intercompany transfers was more efficient than a policy 
which allows only intracompany transfers. 
In view of the recent clamor for more authoritative methods of 
allocating water, this introduction of intercompany transfer in the study 
area represents a bold step in the opposite direction. The ingenuity and 
resolve displayed by these farmers in implementing this allocative 
policy is remarkable, and the study clearly indicates the large efficiency 
gains to the individual irrigator and to the agricultural community that 
have resulted from this market development. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
This study alludes to more questions than were answered within the 
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limited scope of this thesis. Several problems which received only 
superficial treatment here would be interesting subjects for further 
research. A brief list of these includes: 
1. A more complete analysis of the effects of the "basis of 
exchange" used in intercompany transfer. 
2. A more complete appraisal of the apparent differences in 
flexibility between the sale and rental markets for water. 
3. A comparison of the value of land, both with and without a 
water supply. 
The results of this analysis are conclusive and the implication for 
similar areas is obvious. However, because the study area was unique 
in many respects, further research should be conducted in other areas 
where conditions are not so conducive to the development of a water 
market. Particular emphasis should be placed on the feasibility of 
determining spillover gains and losses which might result from a free 
transfer policy. 
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